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 Trends and progress in international development cooperation

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 Report of the Secretary-General

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|  *Summary* |
|  In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 61/16 and 68/1, the present report is submitted by the Secretary-General for consideration by the Development Cooperation Forum, in advance of its fifth biennial high-level meeting in New York on 21 and 22 July 2016, building on a two-year preparatory process. Section I is an introduction to the report and its conceptual framing of development cooperation, encompassing financial resources, capacity-building, technology development and transfer, policy change and multi-stakeholder partnerships. From the perspective of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, section II covers recent trends in development cooperation flows; special attention is paid to improving the targeting and allocation of official development assistance (ODA); aligning cooperation and the rapid evolution of South-South cooperation. Section III discusses the adjustments needed for development cooperation in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals and what effective development cooperation means in implementing the Goals. Section IV addresses the distinctive and mutually reinforcing roles of the different layers — local, national, regional and global — of monitoring, review and accountability of development commitments under the 2030 Agenda. Section V highlights key recommendations and conclusions. |
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 I. Introduction

1. The Development Cooperation Forum provides a global space for inclusive and evidence-based policy dialogue on development cooperation. It focuses on knowledge-sharing and mutual learning for better sustainable development results and facilitates coherence in development policy and across diverse actors and activities.[[1]](#footnote-1) The Forum brings together decision makers and experts from developing and developed countries, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, international organizations, local authorities, philanthropic organizations and the private sector. It is open to all Member States and is a core function of the Economic and Social Council, which has a major role at the global level in the follow-up to and review of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development[[2]](#footnote-2) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development.[[3]](#footnote-3)

2. The present report builds on the two-year preparatory process for the 2016 high-level meeting of the Development Cooperation Forum, to be held on 21 and 22 July 2016, combining analytical work with stakeholder engagement and high-level preparatory symposiums held in the Republic of Korea (8-10 April 2015), Uganda (4-6 November 2015) and Belgium (6-8 April 2016).[[4]](#footnote-4) The aim of the 2014-2016 Forum cycle was: (a) to explore how development cooperation can respond to needs and challenges in developing countries, with emphasis on countries in special situations; (b) to examine challenges and opportunities related to the increasingly complex landscape of development cooperation, including the evolving role of official development assistance (ODA) and the need to align actors and all available means of implementation to the 2030 Agenda; (c) to advance policy dialogue among Southern partners in development cooperation; and (d) to provide further guidance on monitoring, review and accountability for development cooperation commitments at all levels.

3. The overarching theme to emerge from the preparatory process is the importance and the tremendous potential of development cooperation, broadly defined, as a lever for effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

 II. Recent trends

4. The 2030 Agenda, together with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change[[5]](#footnote-5) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, provides a comprehensive framework for development cooperation. A scoping exercise at the outset of the 2014-2016 Development Cooperation Forum cycle produced a working definition of development cooperation as an activity that aims explicitly to support national or international development priorities, is not mainly driven by profit, discriminates in favour of developing countries and is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership. The definition serves not for measurement but as a conceptual framework to help set the parameters for discussing the purposes, characteristics and types of development cooperation in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals.[[6]](#footnote-6)

5. From this vantage point, development cooperation entails a broad area of international action featuring several modalities: financial resources, capacity-building, technology development and transfer, policy change (e.g., to ensure coherence of domestic policies and help to address global systemic issues) and multi-stakeholder partnerships.[[7]](#footnote-7) All these elements will be vital, given the enormous scale and scope of support needed to implement the 2030 Agenda. While much emphasis is appropriately put on the unprecedented amount of financial resources needed,[[8]](#footnote-8) the Sustainable Development Goals further highlight the importance of non-financial forms of development cooperation. The present section of the report looks at recent trends in financial resources for development cooperation, improving the targeting of ODA and aligning cooperation and trends and developments in South-South cooperation.

 A. Trends in development cooperation flows

6. Official development assistance (ODA) remains a unique and important driver of development cooperation. It is available to countries that have limited access to international capital markets. ODA is the only form of international public finance that is explicitly targeted at promoting the development and welfare of developing countries,[[9]](#footnote-9) which sets it apart from other forms of international public finance that may be motivated by other factors, such as the export performance of the providing country.[[10]](#footnote-10)

7. While development cooperation offers multiple levers to drive and support implementation, there is no substitute for delivering on existing commitments to the least developed countries and to the global partnership for sustainable development.[[11]](#footnote-11) In order for development partners to meet or exceed global ODA targets, including for the least developed countries, a recent policy brief[[12]](#footnote-12) highlights the importance of the support of domestic taxpayers and constituencies, leadership that is committed to sustainable development and the institutionalization of the positioning of development cooperation in national processes.[[13]](#footnote-13)

8. Since 2000, net ODA has increased by 83 per cent in real terms,[[14]](#footnote-14) while ODA from members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in recent years, has tended to remain stagnant (see figure I).[[15]](#footnote-15) ODA for non-emergency situations fell in 2014, owing to increasing humanitarian aid and in-donor refugee costs triggered by conflicts and other emergency situations (see figure II). While partial data for 2015 shows ODA for non-emergency situations remaining stable, the potential effect of increasing in-donor refugee costs on ODA available for sustainable development will need to be monitored closely.[[16]](#footnote-16) Ensuring greater linkages between development cooperation and humanitarian aid and promoting systemic investment in resilience-building would begin to move international support into a new and more harmonious alignment.[[17]](#footnote-17)

 Figure I

 Trends in net ODA, 2000-2014



 *Source*: Development Initiatives, based on Development Assistance Committee data.

 Figure II

 Increasing the share of emergency assistance in official development assistance, 2000-2015

Other net official development assistance

Humanitarian aid

In-donor refugee costs

*Source*: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data.

9. ODA accounts for only a very small proportion of the total mix of resources available to developing countries for investing in sustainable development. In 2014, ODA to developing countries ($160 billion)[[18]](#footnote-18) was vastly exceeded by domestic public resources ($5.3 trillion),[[19]](#footnote-19) which are by far the largest available resource in aggregate terms; yet recent research shows that they tend to be lowest in countries where the depth of poverty is greatest (see figure III).

 Figure III

 ODA per person is higher where the depth of poverty is lower



*Source*: Development Initiatives, report, “Investments to End Poverty 2015”.

10. No official estimates are available for activities by private entities (e.g., philanthropic foundations, corporate philanthropy) that aim primarily to support national or international development rather than making a profit and involve a transfer of resources to developing countries.[[20]](#footnote-20) This is part of a broader trend whereby some private sector actors are adapting their business models to be more in line with sustainable development objectives. A conservative estimate for such private development cooperation flows in 2011 arrives at $45 billion,[[21]](#footnote-21) equivalent to one third of all ODA provided by members of the Development Assistance Committee for the same year.

11. The amount of ODA blended with flows from private entities is smaller yet significant, with some estimates at $20 billion or more.[[22]](#footnote-22) There is insufficient evidence as to whether “blending” mobilizes additional private flows, supports national sustainable development priorities or increases sustainable development impact.[[23]](#footnote-23)

12. According to the latest OECD statistics,[[24]](#footnote-24) bilateral ODA to the least developed countries stood at $25 billion in 2015, increasing by 4 per cent from 2014, after several years of a downward trend. The same source indicates that country programmable aid to the least developed countries and other low-income countries increased by 3 per cent, to $39.8 billion in 2015, compared to 2014, while projecting declining country programmable aid levels for some of the least developed countries between 2016 and 2019.

13. ODA to small island developing States has fallen since 2010 and stood at over $4 billion in 2014, calling for special attention and close monitoring, given their structural vulnerabilities.[[25]](#footnote-25) ODA to countries affected by conflict or fragility, for which there is no internationally-recognized target, has also remained relatively stagnant over recent years, holding at around $50 billion in real terms each year since 2006.[[26]](#footnote-26)

14. The most significant shifts in sectoral patterns in ODA disbursements from 2013 to 2014 were decreases in debt relief and general budget support, both due to substantial changes in disbursements to those sectors by a few donor countries.[[27]](#footnote-27) The recent trend away from programme-based approaches, including budget support, needs close monitoring to ensure that it does not undermine the important progress made in improving the effectiveness of development cooperation (see sect. III).

15. While some ODA is directed towards global challenges, and such targeting in certain contexts is clearly needed, it is essential to improve the definitions of what constitutes a global challenge and to what extent it should be considered as requiring ODA. OECD is currently modernizing the ODA measure and developing a complementary framework to map broader flows (see box 1).

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|  | **Box 1: Total official support for sustainable development** |  |
|  | The OECD Development Assistance Committee is leading the development of a new statistical framework known as total official support for sustainable development, to complement its measurement of ODA. Emerging features of the framework include: |  |
|  |  • **Coverage**: all resource inflows, both public and private, to developing countries and multilateral organizations originating from official sources and interventions, regardless of the type of instrument |  |
|  |  • **Scope**: the motivation behind any expenditure reported as total official support for sustainable development must be in support of sustainable development as defined by the 2030 Agenda |  |
|  |  • **Principles**: alignment with developing countries’ priorities and with international commitments and disciplines |  |
|  |  • **Transparency**: capturing both provider and recipient perspectives (project-level information and cross-border flows) and monitoring framework volumes in relation to ODA. |  |
|  | In line with paragraph 55 of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, discussions under the framework should be highly inclusive, and many other significant issues remain to be addressed.a It remains open as to whether to include private flows mobilized by official sources, which requires further analysis to reach agreement on an appropriate methodology to measure the leveraging effect of public funds on other resources that have an impact on sustainable development. How the provider and recipient perspectives will interact and be reconciled within the framework needs to be determined. In general, it will be important that the framework does not create incentives that work against long-term sustainable development — for example, incentivizing private finance flows that are short term and subject to sudden reversals; creating excessive debt; or potentially increasing exchange rate risks through more liabilities denominated in foreign currency.b |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  a See the 2016 Committee for Development Policy report to the Economic and Social Council (forthcoming). |  |
|  |  b See www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/tossd.htm. |  |
|  |  |  |

 B. Improving the targeting of official development assistance and aligning cooperation

16. In the context of the 2030 Agenda, ODA can and should be prioritized further to drive public and private resources to where needs are greatest and capacities weakest.[[28]](#footnote-28)

17. One way to potentially improve the targeting of ODA is for agencies providing ODA to have a legal mandate to focus allocations according to poverty reduction. Analysis shows that donor agencies with a legal mandate to combat poverty, or that consider it a primary goal, are more likely to allocate ODA to countries with the lowest levels of government resources, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), and the highest levels of poverty.[[29]](#footnote-29)

18. Special attention is required to ensure that ODA benefits the poorest and populations with specific concerns, including women and girls (see box 2). Allocation criteria based on gross national income per capita need to be reconsidered in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, taking into account the country’s existing capacities and other social and environmental vulnerability factors.[[30]](#footnote-30)

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|  | **Box 2. Transformative financing for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls** |  |
|  | Although Development Assistance Committee donors’ support to gender more than tripled during the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals,a overall investments remain far below the levels required to achieve gender equality, and only a small proportion addresses women’s specific needs. As called for by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, commitments were made in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda to adopt and strengthen sound policies, enforceable legislation and transformative actions for the promotion of gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment at all levels. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda further underscores the need for gender mainstreaming, including targeted actions and investments in the formulation and implementation of all financial, economic, environmental and social policies, and urges countries to track and report resource allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment. |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  a See “From commitment to action: Financing gender equality and women’s rights in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals”, OECD Development Assistance Committee Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET), March 2015, www.oecd.org/ dac/gender-development/From%20commitment%20to%20action%20FINAL.pdf. |  |
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19. Better targeting of countries should be coupled with better targeting of modalities. At present, ODA grant allocations are primarily focused on countries with low levels of government revenue and high depth of poverty, while ODA loan allocations are primarily focused on countries with low government revenue, with less emphasis on the depth of poverty. However, large numbers of ODA grants went to middle-income countries with lower poverty levels, mostly towards financing efforts to address global challenges, such as climate mitigation and public health.[[31]](#footnote-31)

20. Development cooperation is also expected to be used even more strategically in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals as a catalyst to mobilize other types of resources.[[32]](#footnote-32) In this regard, it is vital to closely monitor and document the evidence on the effectiveness of different ways of using ODA as a leveraging tool, including to catalyse private investment through public-private partnerships in developing countries. The present section points to three uses of ODA as a leveraging tool.

21. First, development cooperation, including through enhanced South-South cooperation, should take a more prominent role in unleashing the transformative power of science, technology and innovation, including information and communications technologies, to facilitate access to environment-friendly technologies, accelerate human progress, develop knowledge societies and close technology gaps. The objectives should be pursued with a particular focus on the least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States, in line with efforts by the newly established Technology Facilitation Mechanism and proposed technology bank for least developed countries. Focus should also be placed on how indigenous/local knowledge systems and technologies could be leveraged through development cooperation. Policy advice and capacity support can be vital in supporting governments and other actors to take well-informed decisions that ensure that scarce financial and non-financial resources are optimally deployed.[[33]](#footnote-33)

22. Second, in the context of the Addis Tax Initiative,[[34]](#footnote-34) development cooperation can provide catalytic support to developing countries to enhance tax administration capacity and employ the necessary measures through various modalities (ODA, South-South and triangular cooperation), depending on the varied country contexts. In some cases, the sharing of technology and innovation and targeted capacity-building for strengthening financial systems have proven effective. More transparent reporting on development cooperation flows for domestic resource mobilization is needed to facilitate a stronger focus on results and provide a basis for knowledge-sharing on what works. Development cooperation could play a bigger role in promoting greater coherence and policy change at the global and regional levels, targeting the systemic issues that affect domestic resource mobilization.

23. Third, ODA for statistical capacity-building is concentrated in just a handful of countries, and it fell in 2014 by almost half in real terms (see figure IV). Data is central to the achievement of all the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 17. Development cooperation should give special attention to the large data gaps and inequalities between developed and developing countries and between people with and without access to data, given the centrality of data for the achievement of all Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 17.[[35]](#footnote-35) The allocation of ODA in the area should prioritize well-defined strategies to improve statistical capacities in developing countries. The focus should be on countries with the lowest government revenue to GDP ratio, with Governments committing to increasing funding to their statistical agencies over time.

 Figure IV

 ODA to statistical capacity-building

Millions of United States dollars
(constant 2013 prices)

*Source*: Development Assistance Committee, Credit Reporting System.

 C. Trends and developments in South-South cooperation

24. South-South cooperation continued to grow despite the slowing down of the emerging economies and dropping commodity prices. It is estimated that South-South cooperation exceeded $20 billion in 2013.[[36]](#footnote-36) Based on partial data for 2014, South-South cooperation might have far exceeded the total for 2013 in monetary terms, mainly owing to the significant scale-up by Saudi Arabia, which more than doubled its assistance in 2014. Existing data also indicates the steady growth of development cooperation provided by China and India.[[37]](#footnote-37)

25. The adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on climate change further boosted the momentum of South-South cooperation and precipitated the launch of several major initiatives.[[38]](#footnote-38) India announced a $10 billion concessional credit to Africa in the five years to come, along with $600 million in grant assistance, in addition to the ongoing lines of credit programme of India in Africa. China announced the establishment of a $2 billion fund to assist developing countries in implementing the 2030 Agenda and launched its China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund.

26. Southern partners have become an increasingly important source of humanitarian assistance. Arab States accounted for some 7.4 per cent of global humanitarian aid in 2015,[[39]](#footnote-39) which is likely an underestimate. A higher proportion of the humanitarian assistance from Southern partners is channelled through the public sector of the developing countries involved.

27. There has been growing diversification of financing sources for South-South cooperation beyond government revenues. National development banks, including in Africa, have taken a more prominent role in financing regional and subregional infrastructure. Multilateral development banks initiated by Southern partners provide additional sources for developing countries to finance their sustainable development needs. For instance, it is estimated that the New Development Bank has the ability to reach an annual lending capacity of $3.4 billion by 2024 and almost $9 billion by 2034.[[40]](#footnote-40) The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which became operational in January 2016, is projected to provide $10 billion to $15 billion in loans annually over the next 15 years. These two development banks can leverage the resources from various sources by issuing bonds denominated in local or international currencies, thereby addressing the financing needs of developing countries, particularly in the infrastructure sector.

28. While specific data are not available, initiatives such as those outlined above suggest that the overall volume of climate-related South-South cooperation will continue to increase.[[41]](#footnote-41) At the same time, climate change has become a priority for the infrastructure development and capacity-building efforts that remain the predominant focus of South-South cooperation.[[42]](#footnote-42)

29. Overall, South-South cooperation is evolving rapidly, which heightens the need for mutual learning and experience-sharing among Southern partners. South-South cooperation may also offer useful lessons for other actors on ways of managing development cooperation. For example, while Southern partners are often criticized for lacking adequate evaluation of their cooperation,[[43]](#footnote-43) the India-Africa Forum Summit and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation have established follow-up and evaluation mechanisms that can offer important lessons on ensuring that development cooperation commitments are met.

30. A persistent challenge to understanding South-South cooperation is a lack of comparable data. Renewed attempts are being made to address the issue. Under the auspices of the Development Cooperation Forum, a number of Governments have worked together to map out existing practices and to identify the needs and gaps in reporting on South-South cooperation at the national, regional and global levels. A technical working group has produced a non-paper and suggested a way forward. The Government of Brazil and the Ibero-American General Secretariat have also developed proposals to address the methodological challenges specific to capturing South-South cooperation. Despite their differences, the various proposals share a common understanding that some elements of South-South cooperation are not suited to calculation in monetary terms and that the purpose of the exercise is not to impose additional obligations on Southern partners but to improve understanding on how to achieve better sustainable development results from their efforts. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has also started work in the area, in partnership with other United Nations system organizations and think tanks of the South, and efforts are also under way by civil society organizations.

 III. Ensuring development cooperation better supports the 2030 Agenda

31. The 2030 Agenda and its fundamental commitment to leave no one behind demands increased coherence and new forms of development cooperation, within a revitalized global partnership for sustainable development. The focus should be on the most vulnerable countries and groups in society and on building their resiliency. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will rely on the contributions and adaptation of all stakeholders. Resources must be spent more effectively and efficiently, with an emphasis on country and local ownership, together with politically smart, longer-term and results-oriented approaches. Improved risk management and accountability, as well as better coordination and coherence among international support mechanisms, are also needed.

32. The Development Cooperation Forum provides an opportunity for Governments and other stakeholders to have open exchanges about challenges and opportunities in development cooperation, and its deliberations and findings can provide information on progress achieved.[[44]](#footnote-44) The Addis Ababa Action Agenda recognizes a specific role of the Development Cooperation Forum as being that of the primary global platform for pursuing issues concerning the effectiveness of development cooperation. The present section examines the key adjustments needed to maximize the contribution of development cooperation for the successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda and how some of the principles of effective development cooperation are growing increasingly relevant.

 A. Adjusting development cooperation to achieve the 2030 Agenda

33. Development cooperation in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals is expected to play a more prominent and strategic role in supporting all developing countries, including in the five areas outlined below. Each area has implications for adjusting development cooperation institutions in all countries.

 1. Orienting cooperation towards the Sustainable Development Goals and developing country priorities

34. All countries are expected to adjust their national development cooperation strategies in line with the 2030 Agenda, including through policy and institutional reforms, and to re-orient development cooperation flows accordingly. Some countries have already launched such processes (see boxes 3 and 4). In tandem with the adjustments made by developing countries, development partners should also make efforts to align their development cooperation in accordance with the priorities of developing countries and make the necessary corresponding institutional adjustments with the objective of increasing the interoperability of their systems with those of developing countries.

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|  | **Box 3: Adopting a whole-of-government approach in Uganda** |  |
|  |  Following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics and the National Planning Authority have sought to integrate national development planning and monitoring through a two-stage process: |  |
|  |  (a) **Alignment** with the Sustainable Development Goals — In 2015 the National Development Plana was revised for the five years to come. The Plan makes reference to and integrates the Goals, including policy coherence for sustainable development; |  |
|  |  (b) **Making ministries and local governments Goal-compliant** — The Authority is now working to ensure that the sectoral policies and budgets of ministries are aligned to the Plan and the Goals, with monitoring and evaluation processes to be spearheaded by the Offices of the President and the Prime Minister. Each ministry deemed compliant by the Authority will receive a certificate of compliance; |  |
|  | The mid-term review by the Authority will take place over a span of two years to reflect progress towards the Goals. |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  a See http://npa.ug/wp-content/uploads/NDPII-Final.pdf. |  |
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|  | **Box 4: Adjusting development cooperation agencies to the 2030 Agenda** |  |
|  |  One of the key opportunities and challenges in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals is to achieve not only more coherent but more integrated policies, ensuring that different policy sectors work together towards sustainable development and leave no one behind. Some features in organizational structures can be identified as making development cooperation agencies more effective: (a) a strong mandate, such as in Sweden, where all ministries have the responsibility to implement the Policy for Global Development adopted in 2003; (b) a cabinet-rank minister to speak for development cooperation can influence the development agenda in a positive manner, as in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; (c) a “whole-of-society” approach that supports collaborative management; and (d) developing the skills and competencies of development agencies to manage new partnerships. |  |
|  |  The necessary adaptations for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals, including fresh approaches in development cooperation, have been started in many countries. In Germany, a number of structures are in place to promote sustainable development cooperation. Switzerland has set up an internal coordination group to examine the challenges of the 2030 Agenda and the implications for the organizational structure and processes in the country. |  |
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|  |  *Source*: Gavas, M., Gulrajani, N., and Hart, T., “Designing the development agency of the future” (Overseas Development Institute, London, 2015); Swiss Federal Council, Sustainable Development Strategy 2016-2019. |  |
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 2. Policy coherence for sustainable development

35. Policy coherence for sustainable development[[45]](#footnote-45) should be embedded as an overarching principle for the required policy and institutional reforms. It calls for greater integration of policies by the Governments both of developed and of developing countries to promote policy space, country ownership and synergies. Policy coherence for development is aimed at preventing countries’ non-development-related cooperation policies from having any inadvertent impacts on developing countries. A new emphasis on policy coherence for sustainable development and integration of policies could further propel intersectoral collaboration and multi-stakeholder partnerships beyond development cooperation authorities (e.g., the Aid-for-Trade initiative, through its multilevel biennial global reviews).

 3. Supporting adaptation and strengthening of capacities

36. Development cooperation can play a catalytic role in strengthening the policy, institutional and technological capacities of developing countries in various areas.[[46]](#footnote-46) These include development and the transfer of science, technology and innovation, including information and communications technologies;[[47]](#footnote-47) the collection and management of data on development cooperation;[[48]](#footnote-48) tax administration; private sector development and engagement; and the institutionalization of accountability frameworks.

 4. Supporting multi-stakeholder processes with a whole-of-society approach

37. Development cooperation in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals implies the need for effectively managing inclusive multi-stakeholder partnerships, with greater emphasis not only on the results but also on the joint development processes.[[49]](#footnote-49) It requires enhanced institutional capacity for public institutions to share power and involve all stakeholders to create a new culture of engagement and participation based on human rights, inclusion, transparency and accountability. Development cooperation is well positioned to facilitate the stakeholder exchange to promote participatory processes, review evidence, share knowledge and build trust among partners.

 5. Strengthening multilateralism in development cooperation

38. There is a strong case to be made for a new multilateralism in development cooperation, with the capacity to take on and spread risks, focus on longer-term results and perspectives and to be less politicized and more selective, accountable and predictable.[[50]](#footnote-50) In the light of the 2030 Agenda and its implications for development cooperation, the Economic and Social Council has initiated a transparent and inclusive dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the United Nations development system.[[51]](#footnote-51) A key message emanating from the dialogue is that more effectively supporting Member States in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals will require the United Nations system to move towards a truly integrated response to the increasingly diverse country priorities and needs, on the basis of joint analysis, planning, implementation, monitoring and review.[[52]](#footnote-52)

 B. Effective development cooperation for achieving the 2030 Agenda

39. Principles of effective development cooperation have grown increasingly relevant, although progress in their implementation has not kept pace.[[53]](#footnote-53) The present section highlights the centrality of country ownership and alignment, among other principles, demonstrating how they can be implemented concretely in response to the evolving environment.

40. **Country ownership** entails the development, implementation and oversight of national development plans that are owned by whole societies, through institutionalized participatory development processes engaging multi-stakeholder partners, including parliaments. In its 2014 progress report, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation notes that the progress made up to 2010 in strengthening and using country systems had been broadly sustained but still fell short of the targets set. The report stressed the need for stronger dialogue among relevant actors.[[54]](#footnote-54)

41. **Alignment** in development cooperation activities by external partners often indicates the extent to which countries own their development processes. Under the 2030 Agenda, alignment means that development partners, both bi-lateral and multi‑lateral, align their support with the Sustainable Development Goals and the priorities and systems of the Governments of developing countries both at headquarters and at the country level.

42. To strengthen country ownership and alignment, three sets of policy and/or institutional reforms are recommended:

 (a) **National development cooperation policies of developing countries should spell out preferred modalities, division of labour and performance assessment frameworks for individual development partners.**[[55]](#footnote-55) Well-defined national development cooperation policies can effectively incentivize behavioural changes and result in better alignment of resources and reduced fragmentation. The outcome of the latest Development Cooperation Forum Survey of progress in mutual accountability also indicates that better alignment of partner countries is generally prompted by monitoring of targets.[[56]](#footnote-56) Such policies should be aligned with nationally owned sustainable development plans, including domestic resource mobilization strategies, which can in turn be supported by the integrated national financing frameworks referred to in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (see General Assembly resolution 69/313, para. 9);

 (b) **Programme-based approaches** — including general budget support, earmarked budget support and basket/pooled funding – are effective tools for aligning and harmonizing development cooperation with national priorities and reducing transaction costs.[[57]](#footnote-57) The trend of decreasing general budget support since 2008 (with the exception of 2013)[[58]](#footnote-58) exacerbates fragmentation and requires close monitoring;

 (c) **Country results frameworks based on the Sustainable Development Goals should be developed as a new incentive mechanism.** A country results framework is a key tool for articulating a country’s approach to monitoring and assessing progress made against nationally driven targets.[[59]](#footnote-59) It serves to measure not only the results but also the long-term impacts of development cooperation, indicating the accountability of all actors. Country results frameworks should be in line with national development strategies and the Sustainable Development Goals and connected to budgetary and public financial management processes. Development cooperation should support developing countries to develop country results frameworks through participatory processes engaging multiple stakeholders, including local governments[[60]](#footnote-60) and the most vulnerable groups in society.

43. Evidence is still lacking on how the principles of effective development cooperation are actually implemented and making sustainable development impacts on the ground in new and different contexts. Development cooperation should therefore facilitate the multi-stakeholder efforts to co-monitor, document and systemize the findings at both local and country levels and to feed back into knowledge exchange/policy dialogue forums at the regional and global levels. The Development Cooperation Forum survey and the Forum and its preparatory symposiums are well positioned to facilitate these interfaces between policymaking and practices at all levels, taking into account complementary efforts.

 IV. Knowledge-sharing and mutual learning through monitoring, review and accountability of development cooperation

44. The 2014-2016 Development Cooperation Forum cycle has focused on how inclusive monitoring, review and accountability of development cooperation for mutual learning and better development results, can function as an integral part of the 2030 Agenda and its implementation at all levels, local, national, regional and global.[[61]](#footnote-61) The Agenda recognizes the need to focus not only on inputs but, especially, on results, engaging all stakeholders, including private sector actors. Efforts at the various levels should operate together, in a mutually reinforcing manner, with a strong emphasis on country ownership and leadership. The systems for monitoring and review of sustainable development, broadly, and development cooperation, specifically, must be meaningfully linked at all levels.

 A. Citizen-led and subnational monitoring of development cooperation

45. The 2030 Agenda places people at the centre of sustainable development and emphasizes the importance of localizing the Sustainable Development Goals and leaving no one behind. This requires the engagement of local-level actors, such as community leaders, local and regional politicians, women’s groups and other civil society organizations, as well as people, both as implementing partners and as beneficiaries of the agenda. It is crucial to empower them to participate in all the steps of decision-making: implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

 1. Citizen-led monitoring of development cooperation

46. The success of development cooperation in support of the 2030 Agenda can be measured in the impact it has on people’s lives. The role of individuals is thus essential to measure results and to influence decisions about the future direction of development cooperation.

47. Several factors enable citizen-based monitoring of development cooperation. These include an enabling policy and legislative environment, strong leadership and readiness for change, inclusive and representative parliaments, effective partnership frameworks and platforms, people’s capacity to engage, timely and accessible information and decentralized development cooperation.[[62]](#footnote-62) People are active generators of valuable data that can be used in parallel with official data to complement and supplement that data, through modalities such as user feedback mechanisms, civic action data collection and citizen engagement mechanisms.[[63]](#footnote-63)

 2. Subnational monitoring of development cooperation

48. Local and regional governments are the key intermediary bodies in directing the flow of information between the local and national levels. Their role in the monitoring and review of development cooperation depends heavily on their position, capacity and empowerment within national structures and responsibilities assigned by central Governments. Experience has shown that, when provided with adequate autonomy, capacity and resources, local and regional governments can participate in monitoring and review more effectively.[[64]](#footnote-64)

49. Official country-level monitoring of development cooperation often involves national Governments and their partners, with relatively low representation by local governments.[[65]](#footnote-65) The effective participation of local authorities in monitoring processes is significantly related to their having been adequately involved in earlier stages of the process, such as planning and implementation, thereby contributing to improved monitoring approaches and positive development outcomes.

 B. National monitoring of development cooperation

50. The effective monitoring, review and accountability of development cooperation commitments at the national level sheds light on the context-specific development cooperation challenges facing the developing countries and the possible root causes and solutions. This information contributes to helping countries to enhance their national development cooperation frameworks and informs the global policy- and standard-setting forums relevant to development cooperation and, more broadly, the follow-up and review processes relating to the 2030 Agenda.[[66]](#footnote-66)

51. The biennial Development Cooperation Forum survey provides evidence on the state of play of development cooperation on the ground.[[67]](#footnote-67) In 2015, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs began updating the survey design through multi-stakeholder consultative processes, with the aim of assessing the areas that are increasingly relevant in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (e.g., the level of integration of the Goals in national development cooperation policies, the role of domestic resource mobilization in such policies, private and blended development cooperation.[[68]](#footnote-68) The current and fourth survey helps countries to structure their assessment around several enablers of effective development cooperation that can also strengthen mutual accountability.[[69]](#footnote-69) They include: national development cooperation policies; monitoring frameworks; institutional structures for development cooperation with dialogue platforms; data and information; political leadership; and capacity development.

52. In the outcome of the fourth Development Cooperation Forum survey, the following changes, challenges and proposals are suggested for enhancing the accountability of all development cooperation actors.

 (a) Currently, 72 per cent of countries participating in the survey have national development cooperation policies. Such policies are more likely to set out the targets for the government ministries of developing countries (92 per cent) compared to those of individual development partners (54 per cent). They are less likely to contain targets for partners that provide mostly non-financial development cooperation (27 per cent). More than half of respondent countries do not require parliaments to hold public hearings prior to the adoption of national development cooperation policies. Overall, such policies should include robust results frameworks as well as specific division of labour and be regularly reviewed by parliaments. These rectifications will enhance both mutual and domestic accountability. National Governments should ensure the full engagement of parliament and civil society in the processes and strengthen accountability towards people;

 (b) 81 per cent of respondent countries have monitoring frameworks for development cooperation, but parallel partner results frameworks persist in nearly half the countries surveyed. Few incentives exist for development partners to align with policies and systems of developing countries. It is therefore recommended that development cooperation should support developing countries to take a transformative approach to developing country results frameworks as a mechanism to incentivize a wider range of development cooperation actors to achieve more inclusive and sustainable development cooperation for longer-term impacts (see sect. III);

 (c) 86 per cent of countries have institutional structures for dialogue in place, such as national development cooperation forums. These were seen to add value in building trust among stakeholders, advancing negotiations on development cooperation, aligning it with national policymaking and promoting knowledge-sharing and mutual learning. National development cooperation forums tend to review contributions by ministries and bilateral partners more than those of local governments or of private foundations and philanthropic organizations. It is vital to invest in strengthening the institutional capacity of developing countries to prepare, convene and follow up on national development cooperation forums and find creative ways to engage the participation of relevant multi-stakeholder partners. This must be coupled with efforts to address the inadequate capacity support for development cooperation actors, in particular parliamentarians and civil society organizations, which remains a barrier to integrated national-level monitoring, review and accountability on development cooperation;

 (d) Developing countries have limited capacity to collect, analyse and synthesize data for decision-making, which is exacerbated by the additional burden put on them for reporting. The Development Cooperation Forum survey shows that only 47 per cent of development cooperation information systems (in developing countries) use the national budget codes and only 33 per cent of the budget codes of development partners are aligned with the development cooperation information systems in developing countries. It is critically important to identify ways to effectively motivate and enable development partners to use country systems and to support developing country Governments to revamp development cooperation information systems, with the aim of strengthening their interoperability with the budgetary processes both of developing countries and of their external partners. Ongoing work towards enhancing the quality and accessibility of data on development cooperation includes efforts such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative, the Open Government Partnership and the International Budget Partnership.

53. In addition, the efforts to secure transparent and valid data on development cooperation involving private entities should be advanced to better measure the effectiveness and impact of such cooperation. This will support better policymaking and engagement; encourage best practice, mutual learning and knowledge-sharing; and help to drive continuous improvement in the quantity, quality and targeting of resources for sustainable development. A more global, multi-stakeholder and joined-up approach to assess the impact and effectiveness of private and blended development cooperation should be within reach.

 C. Regional and global monitoring and review of development cooperation

54. While the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals will depend greatly on national action, most of the goals and targets also require strengthened international cooperation to be followed through. Follow-up and review processes at the regional and global levels should be mutually reinforcing and must complement and support national and local reviews, with the ultimate purpose of accelerating progress towards the eradication of poverty and hunger and towards other Goals.[[70]](#footnote-70)

55. The outcome of national monitoring and review should feed into and benefit from regional monitoring and mutual review processes, which can provide platforms for identifying the capacity-building needs of participating countries and opportunities for knowledge-sharing, mutual learning and technology exchanges. The regional commissions have an important role to play in facilitating information exchange and mutual review.[[71]](#footnote-71) The African Peer Review Mechanism of the African Union-New Partnership for Africa’s Development, the Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific and the Caribbean Community are also noted examples of regional mechanisms for monitoring and review. The current and previous Development Cooperation Forum surveys (for 2013 and 2015/16) showed 95 per cent of countries as indicating that they had made use of the findings both of regional and of global monitoring mechanisms to review trends in development cooperation.

56. The 2016 high-level political forum, under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council, is expected to take a holistic view of implementation as the central global review platform. It assesses progress, achievements and the challenges faced by all countries, and ensures that the 2030 Agenda remains relevant and ambitious.

57. The Economic and Social Council Forum on Financing for Development will review the implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the delivery of the means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The Development Cooperation Forum focuses on the key role of development cooperation as an integrating force for implementing the 2030 Agenda. Its work informs the financing for development follow-up process and contributes to the implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. The high-level political forum takes the work of the Development Cooperation Forum into account in its review of progress towards the 2030 Agenda. The Development Cooperation Forum identifies gaps hindering successful partnerships, helps to design and implement monitoring and review mechanisms and assesses the effectiveness of various tools. The Development Cooperation Forum Surveys map national progress related to the quality, impact and effectiveness of development cooperation.

58. At the global level, future quadrennial comprehensive policy reviews of operational activities for development of the United Nations system can also review system-wide performance in terms of effectively supporting Member States in implementing the 2030 Agenda.

 V. Key recommendations and conclusions

59. Development cooperation holds tremendous potential as a lever for the effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It includes a broad area of international action, featuring various modalities: financial resources, capacity-building, technology development and transfer, policy change and multi-stakeholder partnerships. It should remain tightly focused on the efforts of developing countries to implement the Sustainable Development Goals, with the fundamental concern of leaving no one behind and a special focus on the most vulnerable countries and groups. Effective development cooperation can help to initiate the profound policy and programme integration required by the Goals, facilitating inclusive cross-sector partnerships and providing capacity support for policy coherence for sustainable development.

60. The 2030 Agenda should further propel a change of mindset among all development cooperation actors. Individual and joint actions are required to overcome the silos impeding more coherent and integrated policy responses and to adapt development cooperation institutions at all levels. Global institutions should align their priorities, corporate strategies, operational approaches, funding and capacity with the Sustainable Development Goals. Development cooperation in the context of the Goals should play a more prominent and strategic role in supporting developing countries at all stages of development, with an intensified focus on achieving sustainable development impact. This will require special attention to filling the large data gaps in this area and to enhancing the quality and accessibility of disaggregated data on development cooperation.

61. Official development assistance (ODA) remains a unique and important driver of development cooperation, and existing commitments on ODA must be met. ODA should be further prioritized and better used to primarily target people in deepest poverty and countries with weakest capacities. ODA can target specific areas of need and reach the poorest and most vulnerable people, and it should be used to tackle the root causes of conflicts.

62. ODA can also be an important leveraging tool in areas such as domestic resource mobilization; strengthening statistical capacities; and mobilizing public-private partnerships in developing countries. However, evidence on the effectiveness of the different ways of using ODA as a catalyst to mobilize other resources needs to be closely monitored. Private entities engaged in such cooperation should publish more and better information on the effectiveness and impact of their cooperation and their assessment methods. Blended finance should mobilize additional private flows, support national sustainable development priorities and increase sustainable development impact.

63. New initiatives in South-South cooperation and their follow-up and evaluation mechanisms should be studied to draw useful lessons for other actors on ways of managing development cooperation. Efforts to improve understanding on how to achieve better sustainable development results from South-South cooperation should continue with the support of the United Nations. Development cooperation, including through South-South cooperation, should take a more prominent role in unleashing the transformative power of science, technology and innovation, including information and communications technologies.

64. Achieving genuine country ownership and alignment requires a significant shift in cooperation frameworks and processes in all countries. Development cooperation should support developing countries to put in place, in particular, national development cooperation policies, programme-based approaches and country results frameworks based on the Sustainable Development Goals for achieving more inclusive and sustainable development impact.

65. Governments of all countries, local governments, parliaments, civil society organizations and people have a collective responsibility in the monitoring and review of progress towards development cooperation commitments, with a strong focus on knowledge-sharing and mutual learning for better development results. The accountability of Governments to the people should be further strengthened. Given the breadth and complexity of the 2030 Agenda, resources must be stepped up for robust national and local monitoring and review of development cooperation commitments, supported by effective global and regional follow-up and review mechanisms.

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 61/16, established the Development Cooperation Forum. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. General Assembly resolution 70/1. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. General Assembly resolution 69/313. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Research for the present report was carried out through the series of 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Briefs, available from www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/ files/files/en/dcf/policy-brief-dcf-2016.pdf. The report also draws on independent research and analysis undertaken by development initiatives (see briefs Nos. 2, 13 and 15). Symposium summaries are available as follows: Republic of Korea: www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf15/ dcfrok\_summary.pdf. Uganda: www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf15/ dcfuganda\_official\_
summary.pdf. Belgium: www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/ files/en/dcf/dcfbelgium-hls-summary.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, decision 1/CP.21, annex. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. José Antonio Alonso and Jonathan Glennie, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 1, “What is development cooperation?”. In the present report the definition is modified to include activities that are not mainly driven by profit. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See the inaugural report of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development, “Addis Ababa Action Agenda: Monitoring commitments and actions” (2016), chaps. II.C and II.G. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See the report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, available from www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/ICESDF.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. For a definition of official development assistance (ODA), see www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Tim Strawson and others, Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 2, “Improving ODA allocation for a post-2015 world” (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. General Assembly resolution 69/313, paras. 10, 51 and 52; and resolution 70/1, paras. 60-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 12, “A revitalized global partnership for sustainable development and adjusting development cooperation for implementing the SDGs”. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. For example, the legislative reform in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to secure national commitment to meet the ODA target. See www.gov.uk/government/news/ international-development-official-development-assistance-target-bill-2015-receives-royal-assent. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The following development partners are not members of the Development Assistance Committee: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. The majority of these countries began reporting in 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See the statement by the spokesman for the Secretary-General on proposed reductions in development aid, 11 November 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See also the report of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing to the Secretary-General, “Too important to fail — addressing the humanitarian financing gap” (January 2016), issued in advance of the World Humanitarian Summit, held in Istanbul, Turkey, on 23 and 24 May 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Development initiatives based on the Creditor Reporting System of the Development Assistance Committee. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Defined as total non-grant revenue collected by the Governments of developing countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See Matthew Martin, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 7, “Private and blended development cooperation: assessing their effectiveness and impact for achieving the SDGs”. On the relevant provisions of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, see also the report of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development (see footnote 7), in particular pp. 54, 55, 67 and 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Development Initiatives, report, “Investments to End Poverty 2015”. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See Martin, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 7 (see footnote 20). The brief looks at blended development cooperation as defined in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, as public finance blended with non-concessional private finance, which can be done through: grants, loans or equity contributions that are blended with private flows; and through methods such as guarantees, used to encourage private flows via risk-sharing or mitigation. The brief considers also blending of public and private “not for profit” development cooperation flows. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See for example, Griffith et al., 2014, *Financing for Development post-2015: Improving the Contribution of Private Finance*, commissioned by the European Parliament. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Development Assistance Committee, Creditor Reporting System. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See General Assembly resolution 69/313, para. 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See Strawson, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 2 (see footnote 10). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See General Assembly resolution 67/221, in which development partners are invited to consider least developed country indicators, gross national income per capita, the human assets index and the economic vulnerability index as part of their criteria for allocating official development assistance (para. 23). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 13, “ODA allocation and other trends in development cooperation in LDCs and vulnerable contexts”. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. General Assembly resolution 69/313, para. 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See Ambuj Sagar, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 5, “Strengthening technology facilitation and capacity-building in a post-2015 setting: understanding the issues”, and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 8, “International development cooperation to promote technology facilitation and capacity-building for the 2030 Agenda”. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. See General Assembly resolution 69/313, para. 22 and A/70/320, paras. 56 and 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. See for example General Assembly resolutions 69/313, paras. 125-129, and 70/1, para. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. South-South cooperation in the present report includes official concessional resources (concessional loans and grants as well as debt relief and technical cooperation) that are provided within the South for development purposes, and estimates are by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. See [E/2014/77](http://undocs.org/E/2014/77). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Ministry of External Affairs, India, and Ministry of Commerce, China. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 12 (see footnote 12). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, financial tracking service. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. UNCTAD, “A BRICS development bank: a dream coming true?” (March 2014), available from http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/osgdp20141\_en.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 14, “Making development cooperation on climate change sensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable countries”. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 16, “Re-engineering development cooperation institutions to deliver on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 15, “New forms of cooperation and increased coherence to implement the SDGs”. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. See Development Cooperation Forum symposium summaries (see footnote 4) and the report of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development report (see footnote 7), p. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 16 (see footnote 42) and 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 15 (see footnote 43). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. See the report of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development, paras. 114-124. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Economic and Social Council, Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 8 (see footnote 33). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Development finance assessments, developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Asia Pacific Development Effectiveness Facility, provide a tool for mapping available flows of development cooperation and stimulating dialogue around reforms that may be necessary to strengthen linkages between resources, priorities and results at the country level. See UNDP, “Strengthening Development Cooperation in Support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, UNDP discussion paper (November 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. See General Assembly resolution 69/313, para. 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. See Gulrajani, “Bilateral vs. multilateral aid channels: strategic choices for donors,” Overseas Development Institute report. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. See Economic and Social Council resolution 2014/14. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. See [A/71/63-E/2016/8](http://undocs.org/A/71/63), para. 304. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. See General Assembly resolution 69/313, para. 58, and [E/2014/77](http://undocs.org/E/2014/77). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Available from: www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/making-development-co-operation-more-effective\_9789264209305-en#page1. Initial analysis of the results of the second round of monitoring by the Partnership will be available in July 2016 and the full report in October 2016 in advance of its second high-level meeting (28 November to 1 December 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 3, “Addressing changes and challenges in monitoring and review of development cooperation at the national level”. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. The results of the 2015/2016 survey will be available by July 2016 from www.un.org/ecosoc/en/ tracking-development-cooperation, where the previous surveys (2009, 2011, 2013) may also be accessed. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 6, “Assessing the suitability of different development cooperation modalities for greater effectiveness and impact post-2015”. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Development Assistance Committee statistics. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. See Elaine Venter, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 11, “Promoting integrated, aligned and country-driven results frameworks for effective monitoring and review”. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. The latest Development Cooperation Forum survey suggests that 88 per cent of countries have developed their country results frameworks through participatory processes, while noting that coverage for local governments (63 per cent) is not as high as for national Governments (95 per cent). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. See Angela Bester, “Scoping study on monitoring, review and accountability for development cooperation to support implementation of a post-2015 agenda” (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Office for Economic and Social Council Support and Coordination, Development Cooperation Policy Branch, February 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. See Mniki-Mangaliso, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 9, “Citizen-based monitoring of development cooperation to support implementation of the 2030 Agenda”. Decentralization is by its nature a politically sensitive process, and its rationale, depth and success are dependent on the country context and the nature of political frameworks and regulations setting out how responsibilities are divided and coordinated between different levels of administration. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 10, “Localizing monitoring and review of development cooperation for the 2030 Agenda — Prospects and challenges”. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. For a review, see Mniki-Mangaliso, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 9 (see footnote 62). [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 10 (see footnote 62). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. See Bester, “Scoping Study” (see footnote 61). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. The forthcoming monitoring report by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation includes 10 indicators that provide information on progress on adherence to the principles of effective development cooperation (country ownership, results focus, inclusive partnerships and transparency and accountability). Eight out of ten indicators are monitored at the country level, with two indicators relying on globally sourced data. The scope of the monitoring exercise includes ODA and, for countries where non-concessional flows are relevant, other official flows. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. See the report of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development (see footnote 7), pp. 77 and 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016 Development Cooperation Forum Policy Brief No. 3 (see footnote 55). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. In the 2015/2016 survey exercise, 58 out of 84 targeted countries participated, half of which were least developed countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. See the report of the Secretary-General on critical milestones toward coherent, efficient and inclusive follow-up and review at the global level ([A/70/684](http://undocs.org/A/70/684)). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. See the paper by the regional commissions, “Regional Reflections on 2030 Agenda Follow up and Review Framework”, available from www.regionalcommissions.org/FUR2015.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)