**Zero draft:**

**Outcome document of the Fourth International Conference on**

**Financing for Development**

# A global financing framework

* 1. We, the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives, have gathered in Seville, Spain from 30 June to 3 July 2025 to put in place a renewed global financing framework for sustainable development, building on the outcomes of previous International Conferences on Financing for Development, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the 2008 Doha Declaration and the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda.
	2. We are meeting at a time of profound human suffering and growing systemic, and in many cases existential, risks. Progress in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is severely off track, with financing challenges at the heart of the sustainable development crisis. The existing international financial architecture, financing policies, and actions have fallen short. Yet, the unfulfilled aspirations of people around the world have generated momentum for reform and created the opportunity for the transformative change we undertake to deliver in this agreement. We commit to overcoming obstacles and constraints encountered in the achievement of the goals and objectives agreed in previous International Conferences on Financing for Development, to addressing new and emerging issues, including in the context of the urgent need to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the achievement of the SDGs, and to supporting reform of the international financial architecture.
	3. We appreciate the progress made in the implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Initiatives and efforts to increase domestic resource mobilization, to engage the private sector, and to scale up international development cooperation have helped mobilize additional resources. Digitalization has enhanced innovation, efficiency and inclusion in development financing. We also commend initiatives and efforts to reform the international financial architecture and support the implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda at the United Nations, the international financial institutions, and by groups of and individual Member States and stakeholders.
	4. These initiatives and efforts, however, have not been sufficient and have not kept pace with rising needs. Many commitments made have not been fully met, while longstanding challenges combined with new and emerging issues have significantly impacted the financing for development landscape. We are faced with adverse global macroeconomic conditions and weakening growth prospects, persistent and rising inequalities, escalating debt burdens and limited fiscal space, increasing climate and disaster- related risks, rapid technological change, disease outbreaks, pandemics, and rising geopolitical challenges. We are deeply concerned by the widening financing divides between developed and developing countries, and their impact on the realization of sustainable development, the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the achievement of its 17 SDGs. Overcoming these challenges requires strong political will and urgent action, reinvigorated trust and confidence in multilateralism, enhanced international cooperation and a strengthened international financial architecture through this renewed global financing framework.

## A renewed global financing framework

* 1. We will urgently increase our collective efforts and actions for a large-scale investment push for sustainable development. We will take measures to enhance fiscal space, address urgent debt challenges of many developing countries and lower the cost of capital to enable investments for inclusive growth

while addressing urgent social needs and protecting our planet. To this end, we will mobilize additional and innovative financing from all sources, recognizing the different comparative advantages, risks and incentives associated with public and private finance. We will put sustainable development impact at the heart of our efforts and actions to mobilize financing for development, and will align all flows, public and private, with the sustainable transformations we seek.

* 1. Our efforts and actions at the international level must be underpinned by a commitment to multilateralism and global solidarity based on mutual respect, shared responsibility, and collective action. We commit to reinvigorate the global partnership for sustainable development and scale up international cooperation and support to address rising needs in developing countries. We commit to reform the international financial architecture to make it fit for purpose and fit for a more crisis-prone world. We commit to make global governance more inclusive and effective, to better reflect today’s realities. And we commit to uphold and strengthen rules-based approaches, while respecting each country’s policy space to pursue sustainable development.
	2. At the national level, country-led financing strategies, plans and frameworks, such as Integrated National Financing Frameworks (INFFs), will be at the heart of our efforts. We commit to align international support to national strategies and plans and will coordinate our support through inclusive country-led platforms. We reiterate that each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development and that the role of national policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasized. At the same time, national development efforts need to be supported by an enabling international economic environment, including coherent and mutually supporting world trade, monetary and financial systems, and strengthened and enhanced global economic governance.
	3. We reaffirm that the effective, efficient and transparent mobilization and use of resources must be enabled by freedom, human rights and national sovereignty. Promoting peaceful and inclusive societies is integral to creating an enabling environment for sustainable development. Transparency, accountability, rule of law, good governance and sound policies are crucial at all levels, including anti- corruption measures and safeguarding financial integrity. We commit to developing effective, accountable, and inclusive democratic institutions at the subnational, national and international levels and ensuring responsive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.
	4. We recognize the contributions of multi-stakeholder engagement to sustainable development. We will continue to collaborate meaningfully with the private sector, civil society, the scientific community, academia, philanthropy and foundations, parliaments, local authorities, volunteers, the media, and other stakeholders and to encourage multi-stakeholder collaboration, partnerships, alliances and opportunities to support our efforts to achieve these commitments.
	5. We recognize the importance of addressing the diverse needs and challenges faced by countries in special situations, in particular African countries, the least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS), as well as the specific challenges faced by middle-income countries and countries in conflict and post-conflict situations. We reaffirm our commitments and support the full implementation of relevant strategies and programmes of action for countries in special situations, including the Doha Programme of Action (DPoA), the Programme of Action (PoA) for LLDCs, the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS (ABAS), and reaffirm our support for the achievement of the African Union Agenda 2063. We welcome the call of the General Assembly for the United Nations development system to advance the elaboration of a specific inter- agency, comprehensive, system-wide response plan for middle-income countries.
	6. We acknowledge the important role of the United Nations in global economic governance, recognizing that the United Nations and the international financial institutions have complementary

mandates that make the coordination of their actions crucial, while fully respecting existing governance mechanisms and mandates independent of the United Nations that preside over specific organizations and rules.

## Realizing sustainable development

* 1. The economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and all SDGs are universal, indivisible and interlinked. Our renewed global partnership for financing for development must address cross-cutting priorities that build on these synergies.
	2. We are deeply concerned by widening inequalities within and between countries and a further erosion of trust in international relations and the multilateral system. We will take action to combat inequalities within and among countries and pursue policies that stem the tide of rising inequality.
	3. Underinvestment in critical social sectors threatens progress towards meeting the SDGs and exacerbates inequalities, including gender inequality. We commit to eradicate poverty in all its forms, including extreme poverty, reduce inequalities, and close financing gaps in the provision of essential public services, including health, education, energy, water and sanitation, and building social protection systems.
	4. We encourage all countries to provide nationally appropriate and fiscally sustainable social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and fully integrate the financing of essential social spending into their medium-term development plans and INFFs. We call upon the international community to support countries in ensuring adequate and uninterrupted funding on appropriate terms of social protection and other essential social spending during shocks and crises. We welcome and encourage further efforts to strengthen the consideration of social protection and social spending in International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported macroeconomic adjustment programmes.
	5. We commend the important contributions that young people are already making to the advancement of sustainable development. We reaffirm our commitment to foster innovation and entrepreneurship among young people, including through financial literacy and digital capacity building to enhance their contributions.
	6. We are deeply concerned by severe setbacks in the fight to end hunger. Lack of sufficient investment in agri-food systems continues to aggravate food insecurity. We commit to scale up efforts to address food insecurity and malnutrition and invest in agri-food system transformation using a long-term, strategic approach that ensures better alignment and synergy among the different sources of financing, particularly in developing countries.
	7. It is imperative to urgently and systematically address the funding shortfalls in education and health. We commit to allocate adequate financing to ensure inclusive, equitable and quality education and health care systems and urge the international community to enhance support to achieve this. We also call for increased investment in culture to advance sustainable development.
	8. Achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls are essential to meeting all SDGs and are an essential prerequisite to sustainable development. Gender equality and the empowerment of women brings proven economic benefits and has the potential to contribute to financing for development. To this end, we stress that financing for sustainable development should integrate a gender perspective and acknowledge the importance of an intersectional approach. We commit to gender-responsive solutions across the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. We will mainstream gender equality considerations in fiscal policies and development financing, including through prioritizing gender responsive investments and introducing incentives to address gender

disparities. We will increase investment in the care economy and recognize, value, and equitably redistribute the disproportionate share of unpaid care and domestic work done by women.

* 1. Investing in productive sectors and the creation of decent and productive jobs are vital to ensure that all people benefit from inclusive and sustainable economic growth. We will promote efforts to encourage entrepreneurship, particularly among women and youth, and facilitate the growth of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through increased access to affordable finance and skills development. Special attention should be given to support women-owned and women-led businesses.
	2. The significant infrastructure gap in critical sectors such as energy, transport, information and communications technologies, water and sanitation severely constrains access to essential services, employment opportunities, economic growth and sustainable development, especially in developing countries. LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS often face higher infrastructure costs, which further exacerbates these challenges, contributing to fiscal pressures and weakening connectivity and integration into regional and global markets. We commit to support developing countries, particularly LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS, to develop quality, reliable, resilient and sustainable infrastructure. We will follow an integrated approach across the infrastructure life cycle, from fostering enabling regulatory environments and creating pipelines of sustainable and investable projects, to delivering and maintaining infrastructure, accompanied by institutional strengthening. We will also increase technical support for infrastructure planning, development and maintenance to enable national and subnational entities to implement and manage projects efficiently.
	3. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, but we are falling short of attaining climate goals. Climate change adversely affects sustainable development globally as it exacerbates disasters and extreme weather events. We will take urgent actions to adapt to and build resilience against climate impacts, improve access to climate finance, provide new and additional financial resources, and facilitate the transfer of technology to address the global climate change challenge.
	4. Biodiversity is fundamental to the systems underpinning life and good quality of life and many of these systems are now at risk. We will scale up the provision and mobilization of biodiversity finance for conserving, protecting and restoring nature and ecosystems, including ocean preservation.
	5. More frequent and intense disasters are taking a heavy toll on people, the planet, and prosperity, eroding collective progress toward the SDGs, exacerbating social inequalities and compromising debt sustainability. We commit to scale up investment in disaster risk reduction to safeguard development gains from disasters.
	6. Corruption undermines public trust, exacerbates inequalities, distorts domestic resource allocation and private investments, and hinders economic growth. As a cross-cutting issue, anti-corruption measures must be integrated into all dimensions of financing for development. We commit to foster transparent, accountable, and inclusive governance systems, strengthen anti-corruption institutions, and implement policies that prevent the misuse of resources at all levels. Preventing and combating corruption will enhance financial integrity, improve public service delivery, and create an enabling environment for sustainable investments. We call on the international community to support anti- corruption capacity-building efforts and promote the exchange of best practices.
	7. Digital and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), have huge potential to act as cross-cutting enablers for sustainable development. We will support and promote digital transformation, knowledge sharing and access to technology. We reiterate our commitment to help build capacities, especially in developing countries, to access, develop, use and govern AI systems and direct them towards the pursuit of sustainable development.
	8. We recognize that data and statistics are foundational for informed financing for development decision-making and resource allocation. High-quality data and statistics enable evidence-based policy decisions and enhance accountability and transparency, fostering public trust and international cooperation. We will support programmes aimed at strengthening data collection and statistics, especially on sustainable development.

# A. Domestic public resources

1. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda emphasized the central role of domestic public resources in financing sustainable development. Despite notable tax revenue increases in developing countries in the first decade of the century, recent years have seen stagnation and setbacks, amidst weak global economic growth. Mobilizing sufficient public resources and ensuring their effective use requires decisive action at the national level to strengthen fiscal systems and align them with sustainable development objectives. In a globalized world, the international economic environment also needs to be stable and conducive for realizing the full potential of domestic public policy and resources. Domestic efforts must be complemented by international action, including in the form of enhanced international tax cooperation and robust measures to prevent and combat illicit financial flows and corruption. Public development banks (PDBs) have a crucial role in mobilizing investments to drive progress toward the SDGs.

## Fiscal systems and alignment with sustainable development

1. Fiscal systems – both tax and expenditure – are critical to financing public goods. Low growth, inadequate tax reform, informality, leakages and capacity constraints have led to stagnation, and in some cases setbacks in raising revenues in recent years. On the expenditure side, public spending is often hampered by opacity, inefficiency and fiscal constraints and is not sufficiently aligned with sustainable development, and many fiscal systems are yet to take gender and climate considerations into account. Enhancing fiscal systems through strengthened governance, progressivity in tax policies, transparent budgeting and capacity development will strengthen trust between governments and the people who benefit from public goods and social services.

*Transparency and accountability in fiscal systems*

* 1. We commit to adopt a whole-of-government approach to strengthening tax systems, and to ensuring transparency and accountability in public financial management.
	2. We will promote budget transparency, accountability and efficiency. This includes enhancing oversight, implementing transparent procurement systems and strengthened, resourced, independent and professional Supreme Audit Institutions and parliamentary oversight, especially public accounts committees. We also commit to increase transparency and improve oversight and management of tax expenditures, and to implement minimum standards for tax expenditure reporting.

*Alignment of fiscal systems with sustainable development*

* 1. We commit to align budgets with sustainable development, including through INFFs, with countries choosing the best policy mix for their economies.
	2. We encourage the broadening of the tax base and continuing efforts to integrate the informal sector into the formal economy in line with country circumstances, including through harnessing emerging technologies, such as digital public infrastructure, reducing the cost of compliance and appropriate incentives.
	3. We commit to ensure progressivity and efficiency across fiscal systems as a means to address inequality and increase revenue, including progressive, effective, equitable and socially just

government spending, as well as promoting and strengthening the taxation of high-net-worth individuals, supported by international cooperation, while respecting national sovereignty.

* 1. We will promote both gender-responsive budgeting and gender-responsive taxation, in line with countries’ national strategies, priorities and circumstances. To achieve this, we will develop and enhance methodologies and tools for designing, monitoring and evaluating tax and budget policies with a gender perspective, alongside capacity development.
	2. We encourage the use of environmental and climate considerations in fiscal programming in line with national circumstances. Options include green budgeting, taxation and fiscal rules, carbon pricing, and taxes on environmental contamination and pollution.
	3. We reaffirm the commitment to rationalize inefficient and harmful subsidies, particularly fossil- fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, working toward their elimination to align fiscal systems with sustainability objectives, while taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities.

*Capacity support*

* 1. We will scale up support for demand-based institutional, technological, and human capacity- building for fiscal systems and domestic resource mobilization in developing countries, including to broaden their tax bases, integrate the informal sector into the formal economy and strengthen tax policy and administration and public financial management.
	2. We commit to enhance support for country-led efforts to modernize revenue administration, especially digitalization of tax administrations, investment in information technology systems, improvement of data and statistics and the use of AI.
	3. We will provide targeted support to countries that seek to increase their tax-to-GDP ratios, aiming to reach ratios of at least 15 per cent, which represents an indicative floor below which it is less likely for countries to meet spending needs while ensuring fiscal stability and supporting sustainable development.

*Subnational finance*

* 1. We encourage strengthening subnational finance by enhancing local authorities’ technical, technological and human resource capacities, diversifying income and financing sources, including the development of municipal bond markets where appropriate, and promoting stable and transparent intergovernmental financial transfer systems and equalization mechanisms. We will support efforts to develop local municipal bond markets to unlock domestic capital for sustainable resilient infrastructure and service delivery, including through credit enhancement mechanisms, risk-sharing facilities, and capacity development for local governments to access financing.
	2. We will support national and local governments to prioritize and strengthen their policies, strategies, and practices to implement effective infrastructure asset management over the lifecycle of assets and mobilize revenues as appropriate.

## International tax cooperation and innovative taxes

1. Globalization, the increased prevalence and size of multinational enterprises (MNEs), and changes in business models have enabled base erosion and profit shifting on a significant scale, severely undermining domestic revenue collection, particularly in developing countries. International tax cooperation must support countries exercising their taxing rights, including through fair distribution of taxing rights under double taxation treaties, and fight tax evasion and aggressive tax avoidance. Existing international tax rules often fail to respond to the diverse needs, priorities, and capacities of all countries, especially the LDCs, limiting their ability to safeguard their tax bases. Strengthening tax cooperation and building a fully inclusive and effective international tax architecture are essential to supporting national efforts to mobilize sufficient revenue for sustainable development.
	1. We commit to ensure that international tax cooperation frameworks are beneficial to all parties. We resolve to strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries in the international tax architecture. We also emphasize the importance of careful analysis of the implications of international tax cooperation frameworks and agreements for developing countries, ensuring equitable benefits and addressing their specific challenges.
	2. We will ensure that all companies, including MNEs, pay taxes to the countries where economic activity occurs and value is created.
	3. We will continue to engage constructively in the negotiations on a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.
	4. We will promote inclusive cooperation and dialogue among national tax authorities on international tax matters, and in this regard we welcome the work of the United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, including its subcommittees.
	5. We commit to enhance tax transparency while recognizing the challenge that countries in special situations face by giving special considerations, for example through grace periods for full reciprocity under automatic exchange of tax information, or further simplifying certain standards and conditions. Our commitment includes strengthening country-by-country reporting of MNEs and further evaluating the creation of a central public database for country-by-country reports. We will also consider extending reporting obligations to high-net worth individuals.
	6. We commit to enhance beneficial ownership transparency by strengthening domestic measures on beneficial ownership and working towards establishing a global beneficial ownership registry covering a wide range of assets, legal entities and legal arrangements, such as companies, trusts, and limited liability partnerships. In all of these efforts, we will provide assistance to developing countries in implementing these transparency standards.
	7. We will provide developing countries with demand-based technical assistance and capacity building programmes to ensure they benefit from international tax cooperation frameworks such as the Two-Pillar solution.
	8. We will explore implementing innovative taxes to mobilize resources for sustainable development, including in the form of global solidarity levies, and invite countries to apply them on a voluntary basis.

## Illicit financial flows

1. Countries face substantial and persistent challenges in effectively combatting illicit financial flows (IFFs), including lack of exchange of information and low capacity in using information obtained, inadequate systems for tracking and collecting relevant financial data, ineffective and incomplete implementation of anti-corruption and anti-money laundering measures, and the absence of standardized regulations for professionals and institutions that facilitate IFFs. More and stronger action should foster greater financial transparency and accountability, with robust enforcement contributing to the prevention and combatting of IFFs, and the recovery and return of assets derived from illicit activities. Tackling corruption can restore public trust, strengthen institutional capacity, and have positive impact on global challenges of poverty, social and economic inequality.
	1. We commit to regulate professional service providers at the national level and enhancing international cooperation to curb IFFs and other illicit financial activities. This includes promoting global discussions on standardizing regulatory regimes of professional service providers involved in illicit financial flows, strengthening accountability mechanisms, integrating them into national legislation, and committing to supporting these efforts with an independent review of regulatory frameworks and practices.
	2. We will establish a United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Special Meeting on Financial Integrity to address financial integrity at a systemic level and exchange best practices

including on the use of technologies to combat IFFs effectively and to be held back-to-back with the ECOSOC Special Meeting on International Tax Cooperation.

* 1. We commit to full implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) including by supporting an effective and efficient Implementation Review Mechanism to assist in preventing and combatting corruption. Furthermore, we commit to scale up technical assistance for the implementation of UNCAC in countries, upon their request.
	2. We resolve to enhancing sustainable and transparent practices for asset recovery and return through strengthened international cooperation and capacity-building initiatives and to fostering pilot initiatives for innovative approaches aligned with sustainable development to address barriers and improve efficiency in asset recovery processes.
	3. We will explore the need for a multilateral mediation mechanism to support resolving challenges related to asset recovery and return.
	4. We will identify, assess and act on money laundering risks, including through effective implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards on anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing.

## National development banks

1. National public development banks can play a crucial role in mobilizing resources to support sustainable development, but face challenges that limit their efficiency and effectiveness, including governance issues. Many national regulatory frameworks applied to development banks were developed for commercial banks with different liability structures. Strengthening national development banks can help financing sustainable development particularly in credit market segments in which commercial banks are not always fully engaged, including sustainable infrastructure, energy, agriculture, industrialization, science, technology and innovation, as well as financial inclusion and financing of MSMEs.
	1. We encourage countries with development banks to reinforce their capacities to effectively contribute to sustainable development, including by leveraging resources from multilateral development banks (MDBs), and to review and update their mandates to align with sustainable development, and call on countries without development banks to establish such institutions to address local and national development challenges.
	2. We commit to provide technical support to national development banks to enhance their ability to provide long-term low-cost financing to invest in sustainable development.
	3. We commit to define regulatory requirements that reflect national development banks’ development-focused mandates and distinctive business models and risk profiles, ensuring that development banks are empowered to pursue innovative and risk-informed approaches to financing sustainable development.

# II. B. Domestic and international private business and finance

1. Private business activity, investment, and innovation are major drivers of sustainable development, economic growth, and job creation. Evidence shows that increasing women’s active participation in the workforce and in leadership positions can drive significant economic growth and foster sustainable development. To realize its potential, private activity needs to be dynamic, inclusive, risk-informed and sustainable. However, private investment in sustainable development has not met expectations, which has contributed to a widening SDG investment gap. While there is growing interest by the private sector in sustainable development, investment remains hampered by high financing costs in developing countries, and by misalignment between returns on investment and development needs. Capital markets

often remain short-term oriented and volatile, with short-term financial returns not aligned with long-term public benefit. This underlines the need for systemic change at both national and global levels.

## Domestic financial sector development, enabling environments and access to financing

1. There is a significant need to further leverage the contribution of the private sector to achieve sustainable development. There has been progress in developing transparent, stable, and predictable investment climates at the national level, but more needs to be done. This includes enhancing enabling environments for business and investment to promote alignment with sustainable development.

*Domestic financial sector development and enabling environments*

* 1. We will promote a sequential approach to developing domestic financial sectors, including building a domestic savings base, starting with the domestic banking sector, savings banks and/or cooperative banks, followed by expanding long-term bond and insurance markets as well as equity markets and institutional investment, as appropriate, including building secondary markets.
	2. We will promote policy frameworks that create enabling environments for investment in sustainable development. We encourage further efforts to improve the business enabling environment, including through enhanced transparency, good governance, anti-corruption measures, the rule of law, investor and consumer protection, fair competition, and aligning these with sustainable development. We encourage the development of a model framework towards this end.
	3. We will promote the creation of new domestic investment vehicles, such as development-oriented venture capital funds, and innovative financial instruments, including thematic bonds (e.g. use-of- proceeds bonds like green, social, sustainability, and SDG bonds, as well as sustainability-linked bonds), with sound regulatory frameworks and adequate risk management.
	4. We call upon relevant actors to develop comprehensive risk management and insurance markets, and in particular to develop solutions for smallholder and women farmers and other stakeholders to protect against production risks, price volatility, and climate change impacts.
	5. We will support demand-driven technical assistance and capacity development programmes for domestic financial sector development aligned with this approach, particularly for countries in special situations. We call on MDBs to assist developing countries in fostering business-friendly environments for sustainable development that enable enterprises to thrive, expand across borders, and attract private capital.

*Access to financing, remittances, and correspondent banking relationships*

* 1. We will promote MSMEs’ access to affordable credit through strengthening the MSME ecosystem, including the local banking sector, as well as capacity building, and enhance local currency financing for MSMEs. Particularly **in countries in special situations / LDCs, SIDS and LLDCs, we will support de-risking mechanisms, such as first-loss capital and credit guarantees, to unlock private sector financing and address the lack of collateral and high-risk perception that often hinder MSME financing.** We also call for a review of the possible unintended consequences of regulatory and prudential frameworks on MSME lending in developing countries and explore the use of MSME carve-outs.
	2. We resolve to expand access to financial services, particularly for women and marginalized groups, while recognizing that financial access is just one aspect of financial health and complementary efforts are needed, including strengthening consumer protection, financial literacy, and regulation.We will also promote tailored financial instruments, such as climate insurance schemes, equity, and blended concessional finance, to expand financing options for MSMEs in countries in special situations.
	3. We will also leverage emerging digital technologies, including digital public infrastructure, to deepen financial inclusion, and support investments in development and digitalization of financial system infrastructure in developing countries, particularly in countries in special situations.
	4. We resolve to redouble our efforts to reduce remittance costs to less than 3 per cent of amounts transferred by 2030, including by promoting digital remittance solutions, competition among money transfer operators, transparency requirements for fees and commissions charged,

accelerating access to transaction accounts for migrants, and by working with relevant actors to harmonize regulatory frameworks and ensure a proportionate application of regulations on private money flows. We will also strengthen remittance data collection and dissemination.

* 1. We call upon relevant institutions to support correspondent banking relationships through technical assistance programs to countries in need, building on existing global efforts.

## Foreign direct investment and private capital mobilization for sustainable development

1. Foreign direct investment growth has slowed since the adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda in 2015. Many developing countries, particularly countries in special situations, continue to face obstacles to mobilizing private investment. At the same time, investors face challenges when investing in developing countries, including those linked to information availability. Official sector efforts to mobilize private finance have not succeeded in catalyzing private capital at scale nor have they sufficiently focused on sustainable development impact. Robust action is needed to strengthen the global enabling environment for long-term private investment in sustainable development.

*Foreign direct investment*

* 1. We reiterate the importance of scaling up foreign direct investment in developing countries. We call for the timely establishment of: the International Investment Support Centre for the Least Developed Countries to harness technical assistance and investment-related support for LDCs; the Infrastructure Investment Financing Facility for Landlocked Developing Countries; and the Small Island Developing States Centre of Excellence, which will include, inter-alia, a biennial Island Investment Forum.
	2. We will continue to strengthen existing spaces for developing countries to discuss national sustainable development plans with private investors, promote concrete investment opportunities, connect with public and private investors, and match supply and demand for technical assistance at the global level, including through the SDG Investment Fair.
	3. We will strengthen efforts to facilitate diaspora investment through innovative instruments and call on relevant investment agencies to support such efforts.

*Private capital mobilization for sustainable development impact*

* 1. We call for blended finance initiatives to focus on sustainable development impact, rather than on quantity or degree of leverage alone. To this end, we call for all blended finance transactions to be aligned with national sustainable development priorities and industrialization strategies, and promote country ownership; ensure financial and developmental additionality; share risk and rewards fairly; be transparent and have clear accountability mechanisms; include participation of local communities in decisions affecting their communities; and take into account debt sustainability.
	2. We invite public development banks to harmonize and strengthen impact metrics as a basis for mobilization targets, building on on-going work, and to align incentives with maximizing sustainable development impact.
	3. We support efforts towards the standardization of blended finance instruments to create effective and replicable structures for different country contexts. We further support utilizing innovative structures in blended finance, including equity instruments, to ensure that both risk and rewards are shared fairly between the public and private sector.
	4. We call on the International Finance Corporation to scale up the use of the International Development Association Private Sector Window, including through increased local currency lending, and enhance private equity, venture capital, and microfinance ecosystems to support MSME growth, economic diversification, and the creation of quality jobs for inclusive and resilient growth.
	5. We call on MDBs to establish pools of catalytic capital seeded by development banks, development finance institutions, foundations and philanthropies, with standardized, simplified and transparent access requirements. We support the development of repositories of guarantee instruments, building on the World Bank Guarantee Platform.
	6. We call on MDBs to provide enhanced technical assistance in a coordinated manner, including through the establishment of a Pooled Technical Assistance Platform, to help developing countries, particularly countries in special situations, originate, prepare and support high-impact infrastructure projects.
	7. We recognize the need to support underserved areas in developing countries, particularly LDCs and SIDS, through blended concessional financing, innovative financial mechanisms, and advisory services to boost capital flows for implementing the Doha Programme of Action and the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS. We commit to strengthening the UN Capital Development Fund as a catalytic financier and de-risker for countries in special situations and urge the UN system to leverage its mandate to deploy investment grants, loans, and guarantees in high-risk, last-mile contexts to drive inclusive and sustainable development.
	8. We will work with development finance institutions (DFIs) to support the development of cost- effective, long-term foreign exchange risk mitigation and hedging solutions for investments in sustainable development.
	9. We will work with stakeholders to re-evaluate credit rating methodologies and existing financial regulation, including capital requirements for guarantees and blended finance mechanisms, to ensure that guarantees are fairly valued in analysis and address possible unintended consequences for sustainable development investing.
	10. We commit to further improve the availability, quality and accessibility of data to support additional investments in developing countries, including by working with institutional investors. We encourage the further release of quality disaggregated data, including from the Global Emerging Market Risk Database.

## Alignment of private business and finance with sustainable development

1. Since the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the private sector has integrated environmental, social, and governance factors into risk management, yet aligning business models and investment strategies with sustainable development impact remains challenging. Achieving this will require a systemic shift to better align incentives along the investment chain. The recent surge in sustainable business and finance legislation builds on voluntary frameworks to advance alignment and enhance market clarity. It is essential to ensure interoperability and unlock the potential of such legislation, while minimizing compliance burdens, particularly for developing countries and international entities.

*Incentives along the investment chain*

* 1. We will accelerate and mainstream the take-up of impact investing strategies and innovative financing instruments such as impact fund vehicles, thematic bonds and innovative investment lenses. We welcome efforts in some jurisdictions to require financial advisors to ask savers’ sustainability preferences, and call on institutional investors and financial institutions to accelerate adoption. We also commit to advance the development of responsible and inclusive consumer products while eliminating discriminative business practices, such as gender-based price differentiation.
	2. We call on private entities to mainstream impact into their management practices and governance, and to actively measure it. To enhance clarity, we call on standard-setters and multilateral agencies to harmonize voluntary impact standards and terminology. We also welcome the continued development, scaling, and adoption of sustainability rating and impact valuation methodologies, as well as their integration of the latter into financial models to make impact measurable, actionable, and to internalize externalities.
	3. We will provide guidance for private entities on their roles and responsibilities in supporting the national implementation of relevant United Nations frameworks, noting existing efforts such as the Global Compact and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework.

*Sustainable business and finance legislation*

* 1. We will align regulatory frameworks to accelerate and mainstream sustainable business behavior and adopt sustainable business and finance legislation that is country-led and context-specific, supported by capacity building for developing countries. We call for the adoption of national sustainable finance mobilization strategies, integrated into national financing frameworks. We urge regulators to promote transition planning for financial institutions, aligned with national pathways and global targets.
	2. We encourage adoption of sustainability disclosure legislation based on double materiality, addressing both sustainability risks and business impacts on society. While we recognize the International Sustainability Standards Board's (ISSB) progress in harmonizing sustainability disclosures, we note that its standards are not designed to cover the private sector's impact on sustainability. To this end, we will transpose at national level the standards of the ISSB and of the Global Reporting Initiative in parallel. We will include external audit provisions to enhance trust in reported data and provide capacity-building to support developing countries.
	3. We will adopt measures to advance impact management and stewardship, beyond transparency and data disclosure requirements to embed sustainability into business models, governance, operations and stewardship practices. To prevent greenwashing and impact-washing, we will adopt appropriate standards for commercial and financial products.
	4. We will promote the interoperability of sustainable finance legislation. We will establish international dialogue through a global interoperability governance framework. We will also leverage existing efforts to develop a roadmap for the interoperability of taxonomies, including the UNFCCC COP29 Presidency’s efforts, and we will explore to expand these efforts to also support the interoperability of social taxonomies.

# II. C. International development cooperation

1. International development cooperation plays a fundamental role in achieving the 2030 Agenda, complementing the efforts of countries to mobilise resources domestically, especially in the poorest and most vulnerable countries. Persistent poverty and inequality, climate-induced disasters, and crises are all increasing demands on international development cooperation. Fragility and conflict further exacerbate financing gaps, requiring innovative approaches to mobilize resources for peace, including blended finance, and guarantees to de-risk investments in conflict-affected settings. This has been accompanied by a shift in allocation of development cooperation away from long-term investments in sustainable development and poverty eradication in developing countries. Rising fragmentation, insufficient country ownership, and lack of alignment with country priorities have undermined the effectiveness of support. This calls for a re-evaluation of the practice and purpose of international development cooperation, and reforms to the development cooperation architecture – globally and in countries – as a basis for a revitalized and more coherent cooperation that honors existing commitments, meets emerging needs, and focuses on sustainable development impact.

## Volumes and allocation

1. Development cooperation, including both concessional and non-concessional financing, has grown since 2015 but not kept pace with rising needs. Official development assistance (ODA) reached $223.3 billion in 2023, but at 0.37 per cent of donor-country gross national income (GNI), it remains well below the long-standing target of 0.7 per cent. The decline in the share of ODA that reaches developing countries is of particular concern. There is a need to step up efforts to meet existing commitments, including to help ease financing stress and address critical socio-economic priorities in developing countries, such as poverty eradication, health, education, and social protection. South-South cooperation, a complement to, not substitute for, North-South cooperation, is expanding in scope, volume, and reach. While MDBs have significantly scaled up lending capacity, financing volumes have shrunk as a share of global investment, largely due to capital constraints.

*Oficial development assistance*

* 1. We agree to scale up and achieve our respective commitments to reach existing targets of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI to developing countries, and at least 0.2 per cent of ODA/GNI to LDCs.
	2. We appreciate countries that have set concrete and binding timeframes for achieving existing ODA targets and encourage others to do the same.
	3. We commit to increase the share of ODA programmed at the country level and focused on long- term sustainable development that responds to the needs and priorities of recipient countries, including by increasing the share of budget support in ODA. We invite the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) to develop an indicator to measure this commitment and to set targets for its fulfilment.
	4. We commit to work with developed countries to scale up assistance for humanitarian emergencies and needs, without impacting commitments to development assistance for long-term sustainable development.
	5. We stress the urgent need to address the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, and commit to supporting financing initiatives that promote peacebuilding alongside development and humanitarian action. We recognize the potential of blended finance to support peace-responsive investments in conflict-affected settings, and call for further efforts to establish dedicated investment vehicles and foundations to scale up initiatives like Investing for Peace led by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office and the UN Capital Development Fund to unlock new sources of financing for peace.

*South-south and triangular cooperation*

* 1. We commit to enhance the impact and quality of south-south and triangular cooperation and encourage multi-actor partnerships for funding.
	2. We encourage broader reporting by South-South providers to facilitate a better understanding of the impact of south-south cooperation on sustainable development, building on the existing United Nations Conceptual Framework to Measure South-South Cooperation, and the results of the pilot project; and encourage better monitoring and reporting of triangular cooperation.

*Multilateral development banks and the system of public development banks*

* 1. We will work through MDB Executive Boards to further implementation of the G20 Capital Adequacy Framework Review Recommendations and the G20 Roadmap for Better, Bigger and More Effective MDBs, while ensuring that this does not harden lending terms. We will work through MDB Boards of Governors to support further capital increases in MDBs where needed. We appreciate recent replenishments and commit to establish sustainable pathways to further replenish concessional windows. We also commit to study ways to expand the use of originate-to- distribute models, which would free up capital for additional lending.
	2. We support timely rechanneling of special drawing rights (SDRs) via MDBs by countries in a position to do so, and encourage at least five such countries to contribute to the SDR-based hybrid- capital channeling solutions by the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank by the end of 2025.
	3. We will work through MDB Executive Boards to improve lending terms, including longer loan tenors. We will also work through MDB Executive Boards to scale up products in local currency to better meet local development needs, by strengthening MDBs’ capacity to issue local currency bonds, which can also help develop the local markets, and creating an MDB liquidity pool to better manage local currency risk across the MDBs through diversification, building on ongoing work.
	4. We decide to consider using complementary measures of progress that go beyond gross domestic product (GDP), including the multidimensional vulnerability index, as a complement to existing policies and practices, to inform development cooperation policies, including access to concessional financing. In this context, we reiterate the call made in the Pact for the Future for MDBs, in partnership with the United Nations Secretary-General, to present options and recommendations on new approaches to improve access to concessional finance for developing countries, including projects with positive externalities in middle-income countries, enhancing alignment and synergies for shared goals and coherently agreed policies. We encourage MDBs to implement recommendations ahead of the next replenishment cycles.
	5. We will work through the MDB Executive Boards to strengthen and align impact measurement frameworks with the SDGs and work towards standardized approaches, measuring both positive and negative impacts, and ensuring adherence to social and environmental safeguards in all operations.
	6. As shareholders of the MDBs and other PDBs, we will enhance their ability to work better as a system in service of country-led development strategies.

## Financing for climate, biodiversity and ecosystems

1. The increasing frequency, intensity and scale of the adverse impacts of climate change pose an urgent, and for many an existential, challenge. The unprecedented decline in biodiversity and environmental degradation also pose systemic risks to a large number of social and economic goals. In pursuit of the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and of the Paris Agreement, we reaffirm the importance of accelerating action in this critical decade on the basis of the best available science, reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. In the same vein, we reaffirm our commitments on biodiversity finance, recognizing that the Convention on Biological Diversity is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to biodiversity loss. Notwithstanding efforts, climate finance and finance for biodiversity and ecosystems, including ocean preservation and restoration, are not keeping pace with rising needs. Adaptation financing needs are particularly urgent in developing countries, especially LDCs and SIDS, which remain disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change. Measures are needed to ensure the additionality of climate finance and to safeguard resources to address the persistent socio-economic challenges in developing countries. We reaffirm our commitments on climate finance and urge developed countries to continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance.
	1. In accordance with the decision at the 29th Conference of Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC, we recognize the call on all actors to work together to enable the scaling up of financing to developing countries for climate action from all public and private sources to at least $1.3 trillion per year by 2035. We also recognize the goal of at least $300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action, with developed country Parties taking the lead. We encourage developing country Parties to make contributions, including through south-south cooperation, on a voluntary basis.
	2. We will enhance effective mobilization of new and additional grant-based or highly concessional finance and non-debt creating instruments for just and equitable transitions, biodiversity conservation, and restoration, supported by a strengthened international financial architecture to meet agreed targets.
	3. We decide to urgently scale up contributions to the Loss and Damage Fund to respond to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage, and ensure inclusive design and equitable allocation of funding both at national and sub-national levels in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in responding to loss and damage.
	4. We commit to ensure that developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change receive sufficient climate finance to support mitigation, adaptation and resilience-building, including via financing instruments (e.g. carbon finance, risk insurance, catastrophe bonds, climate resilience funds, and debt swaps) that can adequately respond to their needs and priorities, including ocean and mountain economies, and commit to increase capacity building at the country level to access climate finance.
	5. We encourage multilateral and vertical climate and environmental funds to enhance alignment with national needs and priorities; harmonize and simplify application and execution requirements, eligibility criteria and administrative procedures; remove access barriers for developing countries;

enhance cooperation with MDBs and national development institutions; and encourage use of domestic implementation agencies. To reduce fragmentation, we agree to incorporate new climate and environment finance initiatives within well-functioning existing structures and organisations rather than creating additional entities and to consider consolidating existing climate and environment finance initiatives, and we urge donor countries to concentrate their contributions in climate funds under the UNFCCC.

## Development effectiveness

1. Growing fragmentation, due to a rapid proliferation of donor agencies and channels, coupled with smaller transactions, earmarking, and circumvention of government budgets, increases transaction and compliance costs and runs counter to long-standing effectiveness principles. There is broad consensus that the development effectiveness agenda needs to be revitalized and its implementation better monitored.
	1. We decide to elevate country leadership by developing countries, policy and system coherence by development partners, and mutual accountability as core tenets of effective development cooperation.
	2. We invite development partners to: i) respond to country plans and strategies, and commit to multi- year cooperation agreements that provide stable and predictable funding; ii) strengthen existing national systems rather than establishing parallel systems; iii) reduce fragmentation, including by prioritizing core contributions to multilateral institutions and multi-donor and inter-agency pooled funds, and by leveraging the strengths of both horizontal aid providers (i.e., MDBs) and vertical platforms; iv) streamline and harmonize procedural and policy requirements; and v) ensure all interventions incorporate effective knowledge transfers, capacity building and resilience building to foster self-reliance.
	3. We commit to support policy coherence at all levels to ensure development partners’ policies strengthen rather than weaken development cooperation, including by: i) adopting a whole-of- government approach in delivering development cooperation, in line with principles of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development; and ii) reconfirming commitments to untying aid and reducing the number of exemptions, and promoting local procurement, local audit, and the involvement of local actors.

## Development cooperation architecture

1. Rising demands, a proliferation of actors and platforms, as well as changes in allocation and modalities of development cooperation call for strengthening development cooperation architectures at both national and global levels.
	1. We will strengthen country-led plans and strategies, such as INFFs, as a basis for engaging with all development partners, and will put in place inclusive country-led national platforms for improved coordination with development partners to support national plans and strategies. These platforms should include all relevant actors – MDBs, other PDBs, the United Nations system, bilateral partners, private sector actors when appropriate, and other partners; and will aim to ensure an efficient and effective division of labour, according to each partner’s comparative advantage and knowledge of the local context.
	2. We commit to fully leverage the convening role of the United Nations to strengthen dialogue, coherence and norm-setting in international development cooperation, making the most of existing platforms at the United Nations, including the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) and the Financing for Development (FFD) process, in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders.
	3. We resolve to strengthen accountability and follow up as part of the FFD process, including through a strengthened DCF, to:
		1. Deepen exchange among providers, including members of the OECD DAC, non-traditional donors, MDBs, and others, as well as between providers and recipients, and to promote coherence in development cooperation. We invite the Secretary-General to convene expert technical discussions focused on issues such as coherent financing of development, climate, and humanitarian needs and appropriate use of delivery modalities in different circumstances, to support this exchange, involving relevant stakeholders.
		2. Monitor the delivery, effectiveness and impact of development cooperation in all its forms, drawing on country-owned reporting of data to SDG 17.3.1 as agreed by the United Nations Statistical Commission, on Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), on ODA, on monitoring by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, and on better evidence of development impact. To this end, we will work towards suitable measures of development impact of all types and modalities of development cooperation, building on ongoing efforts, including by MDBs.
		3. Promote learning and sharing of experiences on emerging effectiveness challenges, drawing on the efforts by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and other relevant stakeholders.
		4. Enhance accountability of all relevant actors to their commitments - building on all available evidence.

# II. D. International trade as an engine for development

1. Open, fair and predictable multilateral trade is increasingly under threat as tariffs and trade restrictions are on the rise globally. Digital technology is creating new trading opportunities but is also putting traditional export-based development models in jeopardy. Developing countries with limited productive capacities and trade infrastructure have challenges integrating into value chains. This calls for concrete measures to improve developing countries’ capacities to trade and generate value-added with a focus on the furthest behind, including from trade in commodities and critical minerals. It also calls for a recommitment to multilateral trade that upholds policy space for sustainable development within a rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, open and fair system.

## Multilateral trading system

1. A universal, rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, open, predictable and fair multilateral trading system is a key driver of economic growth and sustainable development. Recent economic shifts, rising trade tensions and restrictions, and divergent interests among members have stalled multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) have added complexity and incoherence to the system, while obsolete investment agreements continue to restrict countries’ sustainable development policy space. To promote such a multilateral trading system, countries should refrain from imposing unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. There are also concerns about the implications of unilateral trade-related environmental measures on sustainable development.

*Multilateral trading system through the WTO*

* 1. We recommit to a universal, rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, open, fair, predictable, multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We urge WTO members to accelerate the accession of developing countries in the process of, or consider, acceding the WTO and to provide technical assistance to support their accession.
	2. We call on WTO members to fully implement WTO agreements on Trade Facilitation, Fisheries Subsidies and Investment Facilitation for Development, including through capacity building to developing countries.
	3. We note with concern that the commitments made at the 13th WTO Ministerial Conference to have a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system has not been fulfilled by December 2024, and call on WTO members to accelerate discussions, building on progress already made to deliver on this commitment by 14th WTO Ministerial Conference in 2026.
	4. We encourage WTO members to strengthen special and differential treatment in a precise, effective and operational way for developing countries, in particular LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS and to take steps to provide such treatment for developing countries that are net importers of food products. We commit to a review of the rules of origin with a view to streamline and simplify them, to enable developing countries to take full advantage of preferential trade.
	5. We invite the WTO Director-General in collaboration with the United Nations Secretary-General to work with relevant actors to review the role of trade as an engine for sustainable development and the SDGs, taking into account the ongoing reforms at the WTO, building on inputs from member states and make recommendations, including on enhancing the development dimensions of a universal, rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, open, fair, predictable, multilateral trading system.

*Regional trade integration*

* 1. We encourage the consolidation of regional trade agreements, including most recently the expansion and deepening of the African Continental Free Trade Area, and support ongoing inter- regional trade agreements to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development.

*Policy space in trade agreements*

* 1. We will work to ensure that all countries, and in particular developing countries have sufficient policy space, including to tackle food insecurity, while remaining consistent with relevant international rules and commitments.
	2. We resolve to undertake reform to the mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlements in trade and investment agreements through a multilateral approach and establish an advisory support service for developing countries for international investment dispute settlements.
	3. We resolve to accelerate the replacement and termination of obsolete investment agreements, building on existing efforts by all stakeholders, including by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

*Trade measures which restrict or distort trade*

* 1. We call on members of the WTO to conclude negotiations on a permanent solution to the issue of public stockholding to address food insecurity and call for the elimination of all forms of distortionary agricultural export subsidies.
	2. We call for discussion in the relevant multilateral fora and agencies on trade-related environmental measures and their impact on the trade and development prospects of developing countries, and for measures to be taken to mitigate any negative impact, including through scaling up aid for trade.
	3. We invite the ECOSOC FFD Forum to consider the impact on sustainable development of unilateral economic, financial or trade measures that are inconsistent with the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, building on the work of the United Nations System.

## Trade capacities

1. In a context of slower growth in global trade, increasing geo-economic tensions and automation, development models reliant on the export of low-cost manufactured goods are at risk. At the same time, many developing countries, in particular LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS, remain at the margins of global trade, with many reliant on raw commodity exports. Weak productive capacities and lack of trade infrastructure undermine further integration into regional and global value chains. Nevertheless, energy, digital and demographic transitions offer opportunities to boost trade based on inclusive and sustainable industrialization, digital skills, agricultural production and transformation of natural resources.
	1. We commit to develop trade-related physical and digital infrastructure, with attention to transport corridor development, in particular for easing trade bottlenecks for the LLDCs, and to support trade facilitation, including trade facilitation agreements. We therefore urge all MDBs and other PDBs to increase investment in trade-related infrastructure in developing countries, including core digital infrastructure, roads, railways, and ports, as well as power grids.
	2. We will support digital and sustainable trade by strengthening multilateral and regional collaboration on digital trade regulations, cross-border e-commerce rules, and interoperable systems. We will provide financial and technical assistance to producers in developing countries on compliance with mandatory and voluntary international standards, including sustainability standards, and facilitate their market access.
	3. We will strengthen the important role of UNCTAD for the integrated treatment of trade and development and interrelated issues in the area of finance, technology, investment and sustainable development.
	4. We encourage public development banks to expand trade finance facilities, including for MSMEs, women and youth-owned businesses, to better integrate them in regional and global value chains, and invite the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to re-evaluate risk ratings for trade finance in regulatory systems, such as Basel III.
	5. We will strengthen the collection and dissemination of disaggregated data, including on gender or race, to guide the formulation and implementation of effective trade policies.

## Boosting trade in LDCs

1. Despite commitments to double their share of exports in global trade, LDCs remain marginalized. Many LDCs are heavily dependent on natural resources and primary commodity exports, which are subject to price volatility causing revenue instability, to technical barriers to trade, and to cumbersome sanitary and phytosanitary measures. LDCs also face tariff escalation in many markets, where raw materials are taxed at lower rates than processed goods, discouraging value addition. Furthermore, LDCs lack the industrial capacity to process raw materials into finished products, as well as the know-how, technical capacity, and resources to meet quality, safety, and environmental standards.
	1. We call on WTO members, including developing country WTO members declaring themselves in a position to do so, to strengthen preferential market access for LDCs by ensuring the full implementation of duty-free, quota-free market access for all products originating from all LDCs by simplifying rules of origin. We also call on extending special and differential treatment measures and exemptions available to LDCs to graduated countries for a period appropriate to their development situation.
	2. We commit to increasing support to LDCs to industrialize, diversify their exports, and to integrate them in regional and global value chains. We will promote tailored technical and finance assistance to LDCs in the processing of commodity and agricultural products to add value locally. We will support LDCs’ ability to comply with international quality and sustainability standards. We will

phase out trade restrictions, including escalating tariffs, that prevent LDCs from locally processing natural resources. We will enhance support for LDCs in developing service sectors and exports, including through strengthened implementation of the LDC services waiver.

* 1. We will also enhance capacity building for LDC governments in international trade negotiations.
	2. We commit to scale up aid for trade infrastructure and facilitation with the objective of doubling Aid for Trade to LDCs by 2031 with at least 50 per cent dedicated to building trade-related infrastructure.

## Trade in critical minerals and commodities

1. Resource-endowed economies have a unique opportunity to leverage their resource wealth, yet a pathway to a more resilient and diversified economy requires deliberate policy efforts for countries to avoid being trapped in low-value added resource extraction. The demand for certain commodities, such as critical minerals which are largely located in developing countries, is on the rise. These reserves have huge potential for sustainable development. However, developing countries often lack the financial resources to invest in sustainable extraction, processing and value-addition activities.
	1. We encourage development partners and international financial institutions to engage in global commodity partnerships to support production, refining and processing of critical minerals in developing countries, and support value-added activities by providing risk-sharing financing such as guarantees and syndicated finances, as well as through technical assistance, and market linkages. We will promote regional arrangements towards this end, including and where applicable with neighboring countries.
	2. We will strive to develop a global traceability, transparency and accountability framework along the entire mineral value chain – from mining to recycling – to strengthen due diligence, facilitate corporate accountability and build a global market for critical minerals.
	3. We encourage the Common Fund for Commodities to provide grants, concessional loans and equity investments to developing countries, especially LDCs, for projects that promote value addition, particularly in agriculture and to expand into processing and manufacturing and invite countries to increase voluntary contributions to the Common Fund for Commodities.
	4. We stress the importance of providing support to developing countries to negotiate commodity contracts with terms that provide predictability and stability for investment, while also providing flexibility to respond to changes in economic and market conditions.
	5. We encourage collaborative efforts involving governments, regulators, industry stakeholders, and civil society to foster fair, transparent, and resilient commodity markets that benefit all participants and contribute positively to global economic stability and sustainability.

# II. E. Debt and debt sustainability

1. Borrowing, when prudently managed, is an important tool for financing sustainable development investments. Maintaining sustainable debt levels is the responsibility of the borrowing countries. We also acknowledge that lenders have a responsibility to lend in a way that does not undermine a country’s debt sustainability. Amid successive crises, shocks and record global debt levels, many developing countries face high borrowing costs and significant debt challenges. High debt service burdens severely constrain fiscal space for investment in sustainable development and climate action. Countries in need of debt workouts face “too little, too late” restructurings, with adverse growth and development impacts. There is a need for a development-oriented debt architecture to allow countries to sustainably borrow and invest in sustainable development, and for support to heavily indebted developing countries in need of immediate debt relief to return to a path of debt sustainability.

## Sustainable and responsible borrowing and lending, and debt crisis prevention

1. Public debt accumulation and rising debt vulnerabilities over the past decade necessitate international and national efforts to strengthen debt management and debt transparency and responsible borrowing and lending.
	1. We request the United Nations Secretary-General to create a working group to develop a set of principles on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing, building on the existing principles and guidelines, and design tools for continuous monitoring and assessment of their implementation across different stages of the sovereign debt cycle, including issuance, management, sustainability, repayment and restructuring.
	2. We commit to enhanced parliamentary oversight and strengthened public investment management systems, with the aim to increase transparency and accountability over domestic and external debt issuance and use. We will scale up capacity building to support developing countries better manage their public debt, including domestic debt, and effectively invest borrowed resources.
	3. We urge the creation of a single global central debt data registry, housed in a relevant international institution, to harmonize debt data reporting, and the streamlining of existing debt databases of international financial institutions and organizations. This will contribute to enhanced debt transparency by both borrowing countries and creditors by improving disclosure, reporting and data reconciliation.
	4. We call on all creditors to include standardized state-contingent clauses in loan and debt contracts to ensure debt service standstills during times of crises that are not covered by standard force majeure clauses. We commit to include such clauses in official lending. We invite the IMF in collaboration with other relevant international financial institutions to carry out analysis of obstacles and solutions to help mainstream state-contingent clauses into commercial debt contracts.
	5. We encourage official lenders to increase lending in local currencies in developing countries to address currency risks and call for technical assistance to countries in special situations for issuing local currency debt in domestic markets and global financial markets.
	6. We will strengthen measures to curb corrupt lending and borrowing, including through fully utilizing UNCAC and exploring a UNCAC protocol that makes such contracts unenforceable.
	7. We encourage the creation of, and support existing, platforms for borrower countries to discuss technical issues, coordinate approaches, and share information and experiences in addressing debt challenges.

## Fiscal space for investment in countries facing debt challenges

1. Rising debt service burdens and high costs of capital, exacerbated by recurrent external shocks, call for efforts to significantly lower the cost of borrowing, including more comprehensive and systematic support for countries that, while solvent, are burdened with high debt servicing costs. High sovereign borrowing costs also drive up the cost of capital for private investments, making sustainable development investments that would be financially viable in developed countries unattractive in these contexts.
	1. We appreciate ongoing efforts in this area, including the three-pillar approach proposed by the IMF and World Bank to help address liquidity challenges, as well as the proposed SIDS Debt Sustainability Support Service (DSSS). We call for the operationalization of DSSS and the expansion of its eligibility to cover other developing countries, especially LDCs, and encourage official creditors to provide coordinated and enhanced liquidity and liability management support to developing countries committed to their ambitious development objectives through the use of

financing tools such as guarantees, credit enhancements, debt swaps and buybacks, and legal instruments such as seniority clauses during buybacks to incentivize private creditor participation.

* 1. We call for an institutional home within an existing facility of an international financial institution to provide such support in a systematic manner. This strengthened facility would: coordinate liquidity support from multilateral and bilateral creditors; coordinate development of term sheets for net present value-neutral rescheduling; offer a range of financial and legal tools to facilitate or incentivize liability management and reduce the cost of capital; support scaling up debt swaps, when appropriate, and maximizing their impact, including by simplifying their design, reducing transaction costs and increasing efficiency; provide countries with technical assistance, capacity support and legal advice, including cost-benefit analysis and the effective use of financial instruments such as debt swaps and dealing with sophisticated creditors; and engage with credit rating agencies to address concerns over adverse rating impacts of official debt programs.

## Debt architecture for debt crisis resolution

1. Heavily indebted countries require debt relief to restore them to a path of debt sustainability. But sovereign debt restructurings are often initiated too late and remain too slow and shallow, reflecting challenges with coordinating a diverse and changing set of creditors. The ad-hoc nature of debt resolution processes add uncertainty to the timeline and outcomes. Restructurings often do not provide sufficient fiscal space for necessary SDG investment, and result in profound economic and social costs. Restructurings should also account for the development needs of the indebted countries during the restructuring process. A more development-oriented international debt architecture in which all creditors effectively participate could ensure efficient, fair, predictable, coordinated, timely and orderly restructurings, building on the call made in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.
	1. Building on the ongoing efforts, we encourage the G20 to further strengthen the Common Framework by: expanding coordinated debt treatments to highly indebted countries which are currently ineligible; standardizing debt service suspension during negotiations; developing a user manual for debtors with clear timelines; and developing an accessible guideline for assessing comparability of treatment (CoT) and refining tools for enforcing CoT. We encourage debtor countries that need debt relief to actively seek debt treatments and pre-emptive debt restructuring.
	2. We support the setting up of a working group to develop a model law on debt restructuring for Member States to consider adopting as part of their domestic legislation. We encourage major financial jurisdictions to pass domestic legislations to limit holdout creditors and facilitate effective debt restructuring.
	3. We encourage the continued adoption of collective action clauses in bonds and majority voting provisions in loan agreements. We call for assessing and refining contractual tools and instruments used in debt restructuring to facilitate participation of creditors, including most favoured creditor clauses, claw back clauses, loss reinstatement features, and value recovery instruments.
	4. We support entities such as the African Legal Support Facility, which provide legal and financial advice to developing countries during negotiations and structuring of complex debt transactions and workouts with creditors; and/or will utilize the above facility for this purpose.
	5. Building on existing work, the review of the sovereign debt architecture envisioned in the Pact for the Future and the United Nations Secretary-General’s update on progress and proposals, we will initiate an intergovernmental process at the United Nations, with a view to closing gaps in the debt architecture and exploring options to address debt sustainability, including but not limited to a multilateral sovereign debt mechanism.

## Debt sustainability assessments and credit ratings

1. Sound and transparent analysis on sovereign debt sustainability is important for the smooth functioning and fair pricing of debt markets. Both public sector-led debt sustainability assessments and private sector credit ratings have evolved to address some of their weaknesses, but challenges remain, including in accurately assessing the risks and benefits of public policies affecting long-term debt sustainability. Private sector credit ratings of sovereigns are insufficiently transparent and may reinforce short-term, procyclical market reactions, undermining the ability of developing countries to borrow and invest in sustainable development. Stronger public action and regulatory efforts can ensure that credit assessments are more accurate, objective and long-term oriented.
	1. Building on the ongoing LIC-DSF review, we urge the IMF and World Bank to continue to refine debt sustainability assessments to better account for SDG spending needs, better capture climate and nature risks, account for investments (e.g. in resilience, nature protection, and productive capacity) and their impact on long-term growth and sustainable development, which requires a longer-term perspective, and to more accurately distinguish between solvency and liquidity. We recommend that the IMF and the World Bank implement revisions in an open and consultative manner. We will strengthen countries' capacities to carry out their own debt sustainability assessments.
	2. We commit to promote transparent, accurate, objective and long-term model-based credit assessments. We call on public entities conducting economic surveillance to publish such assessments in ways that can be compared to private credit ratings. We also call on all ratings to positively reflect the long-term debt sustainability benefits of voluntary debt restructurings, rather than penalizing countries that engage in such transactions and official sector debt programs. We also agree to reduce mechanistic reliance on ratings and implement consistent regulatory regimes for rating agencies (as laid out under Systemic Issues).

# II. F. Addressing systemic issues

1. The international financial architecture – the existing set of international financial frameworks, rules, institutions and markets that safeguard the stability and function of the global monetary and financial systems – plays a pivotal role in shaping sustainable development outcomes. Notwithstanding recent efforts to reform the architecture, increasing inequalities, extreme poverty, risks of spillover effects of macroeconomic policies and financial crises to developing countries, and a widening financing divide persist. Addressing these systemic challenges is an urgent priority. With full respect for independent mandates and governance bodies, the international community must work together to ensure that the international financial architecture becomes more efficient, equitable, fit for the world of today and remain dynamic and responsive to challenges facing developing countries. It is of utmost importance to deliver more effective, credible, accountable, and legitimate institutions. Solutions are urgently needed, including those related to global governance, the global financial safety net, international aspects of financial regulation, the international monetary system and global macroeconomic coordination and coherence. Our successful implementation of these actions reflects our commitment to rebuild trust in multilateralism.

## Global economic governance

1. International economic and financial institutions have made significant efforts at governance reform. Recent efforts to realign IMF quotas and World Bank shareholding are welcome. However, the current architecture does not accurately reflect the diversity and complexity of the world. Insufficient representation and voice of developing countries in international institutions has resulted in insufficient recognition of developing country needs and a suboptimal allocation of resources. The representation

and voice of developing countries in norm-setting, global economic governance, and decision-making in international economic and financial institutions must be enhanced to deliver more effective, credible, accountable, and legitimate institutions. The international system must work effectively for all countries, especially those that need the most support.

* 1. We recommit to further IMF quota realignment to enhance developing country voice and better reflect members’ relative positions in the world economy, while protecting the shares of the poorest members. We will work through the Governors of the IMF to consider restoring basic votes back to 1/9 the total voting rights in the IMF, among other measures.
	2. We will work through the World Bank Board of Governors to conduct a comprehensive and successful World Bank shareholding review in 2025 that delivers a more equitable balance of voting power at the institution, to speedily implement the review outcomes, and to ensure future reviews achieve a balance of voting power between country groups.
	3. We will work through the Executive Boards of the international financial institutions to consider increasing the sizes of the boards of directors to create balanced geographic representation of the members. We will work through the IMF Executive Board to enhance geographical representation in IMF senior management positions, particularly for Africa, including the creation of an additional IMF Deputy Managing Director. We also commit to achieve gender balance in the executive boards of all international organizations through more balanced nominations to the boards. We will work through all international organization boards to conduct regular reviews on diversity in the board and the executive and senior leadership to address geographic underrepresentation and gender imbalance, and to publish regular public reports on diversity and our reviews.
	4. We commit to enhance the transparency and accountability of decision making at international organizations.

## Global financial safety net

1. The global financial safety net, a multilayered arrangement for responding to crises with the IMF at its centre, has both gaps in its architecture and uneven coverage. During crises, resources available through multilateral and regional arrangements have not matched needs, as demonstrated during the pandemic. This has prompted some developing countries to accumulate excess international reserves in order to cushion volatility, which contributes to resource transfers to developed countries and reduces investment capacity in those developing countries. With increasing systemic risks and growing frequency and intensity of crises, including those related to climate change, many countries will need external support to manage volatility and shocks. The global financial safety net must be expanded, have better coverage, and be more reliable to allow countries to expand their investment in their sustainable development and take on leverage without fear of incurring liquidity and financial crises.
	1. We welcome the conclusion of the IMF facilities review in 2023 and 2024. We will work through the IMF Executive Board to create a much larger pool of resources, accessible to all countries, for fast disbursement in response to shocks and crises, for example through an IMF multilateral swap line, and we will consider adjusting borrowing limits in all layers of the safety net to ensure that emergency and stand-by resources can meet needs.
	2. We welcome recent action on IMF surcharges and will work through the IMF Executive Board to consider suspending surcharges during disasters and exogenous shocks.
	3. We will work through the IMF board to consider ways to ease access to the Resilience and Sustainability Trust, including by removing the requirement of an upper credit tranche programme. We welcome the recent PRGT review and will work through the IMF Executive Board to further increase the IMF’s self-sustaining capacity to lend concessional resources without worsening borrowers’ terms of financing.
	4. We welcome the IMF’s issuance of SDRs in 2021 and the rechannelling for countries in need by both developed and developing countries in a position to do so. We encourage countries in a position to do so to expeditiously rechannel 50 per cent of current unused SDRs, including through MDBs, while retaining SDR’s liquidity and reserve asset character. We will work through the IMF Executive Board to consider the issuance of new SDRs to help address the developing country liquidity and debt crises.
	5. We will work through the IMF Board of Governors to review SDRs to create a new playbook that strengthens their role, including: a rules-based approach to recommendations for SDR issuance to speed up approval by the IMF Executive Board of new issuances; international commitments based on voluntary ex ante agreements to facilitate expeditious rechannelling of unused SDRs to countries in need; and considering approaches that allow SDR allocations that respond specifically to the needs of countries during future crises and shocks.
	6. We commit to strengthen existing regional arrangements and closing gaps in coverage by supporting the creation of robust new regional arrangements, especially in Africa, to enhance the complementarity of the layers of the global financial safety net.

## Regulation for a sustainable financial system

1. Credit ratings, which affect the cost of borrowing, are much less regulated than other aspects of the financial system. Credit assessments are pro-cyclical and excessively focused on short-term factors, which can disincentivize credit based on long-term growth and sustainability prospects. The sovereign ceiling on corporate ratings has unwarranted negative impacts on capital markets access for entities in developing countries. Regulatory regimes should encourage credit ratings to be more transparent, accurate, objective, and long-term oriented.
	1. To help enhance the transparency and accuracy of ratings and ensure regulation of this sector is appropriate, we decide to establish an annual special high-level meeting under the auspices of ECOSOC for dialogue among Member States, credit rating agencies, regulators, standard setters, and long-term investors, along with public institutions that publish independent debt sustainability analysis. We request ECOSOC to determine the modalities to ensure that it builds on existing processes.
	2. We recommit to reduce the mechanistic reliance on credit-rating agency assessments in regulatory frameworks.
2. Adequate financial regulation is essential to the stability and sustainability of the financial system. While banking regulation has been strengthened since the 2009 financial crisis, financial regulatory frameworks can misprice risks, especially related to new challenges and instruments (such as lending with guarantees), which can raise the cost of borrowing for sustainable development investments, especially in LDCs. Incorporation of environmental sustainability into financial regulation is in its infancy. Climate risk disclosure, which is most advanced, is not sufficient. Creating an effective financial regulatory framework that addresses social and environmental impact, coupled with effective climate policies, can generate both stability and sustainability.
	1. We invite the FSB to launch a review of the potential mispricing of risk in international risk- weighting frameworks used in regulation, such as Basel III, to ensure that weightings correctly reflect risks in different country contexts, including for guarantees and blended finance, SMEs, infrastructure, and trade finance, and to review risks posed by the asset management industry. We invite the FSB to present their findings at the ECOSOC FFD Forum.
	2. Without diluting our focus on financial stability, we commit to expand our financial regulations to incorporate climate transition plans and climate stress testing and invite the FSB to consider including sustainability factors in risk weightings.
	3. We invite the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the IMF to work together with developing countries to develop a prudential banking regulation framework to address difference in risk profiles, especially in the LDCs.

## Public payment systems

1. International payments, often intermediated by correspondent banks, have significant frictions and high and variable costs. As central banks explore digital currencies and inter-operable settlement systems, policy makers need to consider new macroeconomic risks.
	1. We invite the BIS to include more developing countries in discussions on how to create central bank digital currencies that harness the benefits of digital technologies, increase efficiency of cross-border payments, and address potential macroeconomic risks.
	2. We encourage the BIS, IMF, and other relevant institutions to provide capacity building to support developing countries to make robust design and implementation decisions about central bank digital currencies.

# II. G. Science, technology, innovation and capacity building

1. Science, technology and innovation (STI) have advanced at an unprecedented scale and pace, amplifying its contribution in sustainable development. However, its full potential is constrained by persistent inequality in innovation and technology access, along with inadequate digital infrastructure and digital public goods. Limited national capacity and insufficient international support further hinder the development and use of technologies, including fintech, for sustainable development. Unregulated technological advances can also have unintended consequences for economic and social outcomes, cause environmental degradation, and worsen gender inequality. Coordinated national and international efforts are needed to close digital divides, leverage technological advances for sustainable development, and realize the full potential of digital technology in achieving financial inclusion and financial health.

## Technological advances for sustainable development

1. STI plays a critical role in pursuing sustainable development. However, developing countries, in particular, face challenges in leveraging the potential of STI, further impeding their sustainable development. To realize the full potential of STI, countries need strengthened technical capacity and resources for designing and implementing effective, mission-oriented, multistakeholder STI policy and enhancing national innovation systems. Policy frameworks and regulation should also be strengthened to provide adequate oversight of technology, ensuring it supports sustainable development and the full enjoyment of human rights.

*National innovation systems, including STI4SDG roadmaps*

* 1. We will support countries to develop and implement mission-oriented national STI4SDG roadmaps that foster an enabling environment to incentivize innovations aligned with sustainable development. We will provide support and training on strategic STI governance, regulation, and institutions for STI policy in developing countries, especially countries in special situations.
	2. We call for strengthened competition laws that are adapted to the digital economy, to foster an open, non-discriminatory, fair and inclusive environment for innovation and technological development, and deepened international cooperation between national competition authorities, given the global reach of major technology firms and the impact of regulatory spillover.

*Technology transfer, knowledge sharing, capacity building, and financing for STI*

* 1. We acknowledge the role of intellectual property regimes and the application of TRIPS flexibilities in contributing to innovation and sustainable development. We commit to promote and encourage further agreements on technology transfer.
	2. We urge operationalizing the Online University for LDCs to promote science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education.
	3. We will facilitate access to STI funds, through capacity building and knowledge sharing, including ensuring that resources are directed to countries and regions with high needs and impacts. We call for the IFIs, international organizations, and development partners to enhance financing and capacity support to STI projects in developing countries, and invite public development banks, in particular, to scale up support for investment in mission-oriented innovation through risk-sharing instruments, public venture capital funds or similar instruments.
	4. We will promote equitable access to AI and ensure adequate financing for capacity building for AI adoption, for development of a regulatory ecosystem that promotes safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems, and for facilitating developing countries’ participation in the global AI dialogue, while taking into consideration the previous internationally agreed outcomes.

*International cooperation on STI*

* 1. We resolve to enhance national and international cooperation between actors in the STI ecosystems, including MDBs and DFIs, on open science, open data, digital public goods, affordable and open-source technology, education, and collaborative international research and development that ensures access to countries in need.
	2. We commit to strengthen the capacity of the UN Technology Facilitation Mechanism and the Technology Bank for LDCs with adequate resources so they can effectively fulfill their mandates.
	3. We support enhanced collaboration among the STI Forum, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development, and other international platforms. This includes promoting digital infrastructure-related knowledge sharing, particularly in identifying investment risks and opportunities, among DFIs and other partners.
	4. We request the Interagency Task Team on STI for the SDGs to undertake an assessment of the major obstacles that hamper international diffusion of technologies for the SDGs, especially green technologies.

## Digital divides

1. The lack of essential digital infrastructure poses a significant barrier for many developing countries, especially countries in special situations, exacerbating the digital divides, including the gender digital divide. Increasing investment in resilient digital public infrastructure and digital public goods is extremely important. Achieving universal connectivity will require mapping out gaps and measures to scaling up investment at the national level with the support of the international community.
	1. We commit to develop financing plans and coordinate investment in digital public infrastructures and digital public goods as part of national financing frameworks, and technical support from partners through country-led platforms. We will support countries in their design of digital infrastructure financing models and impact measurement to close the connectivity gap and improve the quality and affordability of connectivity as called for in the Global Digital Compact.
	2. We will promote access to science and technology for women, youth, and children.
	3. We invite countries to bring projects on digital public infrastructures and digital public goods to the SDG Investment Fair.

## Digital technology for financial inclusion and financial health

1. The rapid growth of digital technology has improved financial inclusion for individuals and MSMEs. Despite progress, there are still significant gaps in access and use, and new risks, as some fintech companies are not subject to the same regulations as other financial institutions. To fully realize the potential of fintech, complementary investments in technology access, financial and digital literacy skills, infrastructure and regulatory frameworks are needed. Coordinated national policy actions and strengthened international cooperation, especially on emerging issues, are essential to safeguard consumer protection, foster fair competition, ensure financial stability, and uphold financial integrity.
	1. We will support countries in creating enabling domestic environments for development of digital financial services, underpinned by partnerships between local banks and fintech firms to expand financial inclusion services' reach, especially in rural areas, and adaptive regulatory frameworks that effectively manage the opportunities and risks of new technologies.
	2. We commit to implement comprehensive and ethical financial and digital literacy programmes that target all segments of society, including women, youth, and marginalised communities, including by mainstreaming these into educational curricula at all levels.
	3. We invite relevant stakeholders to the respective sessions of the ECOSOC FFD Forum to exchange knowledge and share experiences and expertise on policy and regulatory frameworks to respond to the development of digital financial services, avoiding silo-style regulation.
	4. We will consider utilizing the Global Dialogue on AI Governance, convened in accordance with the Global Digital Compact, as a platform to discuss governance of fintech, including exploring the development of a set of principles for safe, equitable, and inclusive development and use of AI in fintech.

# III. Data, monitoring and follow up

1. Timely, reliable, high-quality, and disaggregated data and statistics are essential for advancing the financing for development agenda. They support informed decision-making across all action areas while enabling effective monitoring and follow-up. Strengthened mechanisms for monitoring and follow-up are equally vital to ensuring sustained progress on financing for development.

## Investment in data and statistical systems

1. Many Member States, in particular developing countries, have not been able to fully capitalize on the power of data. Investment in data remains insufficient, resulting in gaps in the availability of high quality and disaggregated data and statistics (e.g., on gender and sex) needed to inform evidence-based decision making, especially for developing countries. This was particularly apparent during the COVID-19 crisis.
	1. We commit to accelerate progress on the Cape Town Global Action Plan for Sustainable Development Data, and invest in national data and statistical systems, including digital infrastructure. We further commit to the Medellin Framework [to be adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission in March 2025].
	2. We commit to increase financial support for data and statistical capacity building in developing countries, especially countries in special situations and those facing specific challenges, and will scale up predictable financing for sustainable development data. This includes support for the SIDS Data Hub as called for in the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS.

## Data frameworks for sustainable development, accessibility and innovation

1. The SDG indicator 17.3.1 on financing data was developed in 2022 to track resources mobilized for developing countries from multiple sources, alongside a breakthrough UN conceptual framework to measure South-South cooperation. Stronger efforts are needed to enhance disaggregated data, accessibility and innovative data sources. Political momentum is also growing for measuring and monitoring progress in sustainable development using metrics that go beyond GDP.
	1. We support the continued strengthening of the SDG indicator framework, including support for enhancing the consistent reporting on and use of SDG indicator 17.3.1 and prioritization of high- quality, disaggregated data collection, including on gender and vulnerable groups.
	2. We encourage the promotion of open, interoperable data platforms and standards to improve data sharing and accessibility, addressing challenges for developing countries.
	3. We encourage the enhanced coordination on data among international financial institutions, the United Nations, Member States, and development agencies.
	4. We encourage leveraging innovation in non-traditional data sources like citizen-generated data and remote sensing, supported by public-private partnerships and specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound or SMART indicators.
	5. We commit to advance the process on measures of progress on sustainable development that complement or go beyond GDP, as agreed in the Pact for the Future.

## Monitoring and follow-up

1. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda strengthened the financing for development follow-up process. However, challenges remain with participation of Member States, engagement of all relevant stakeholders, tight negotiation timelines, and insufficient space for sustained engagement between ECOSOC and the Executive Directors of the Bretton Woods institutions. There is also room to improve the incorporation of national and regional perspectives into the global dialogue. The strengthened follow-up process after the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development will enhance monitoring, global policy coherence, and links to regional and national-level action, without significant new burdens or data demands.
	1. We request the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development to propose a concise set of financing indicators to measure the progress and implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and [Seville outcome], using existing data where possible, with intergovernmental negotiation and agreement on the framework at the General Assembly in the second half of its 80th session; emphasizing the importance of disaggregation of data where possible**.** Financing indicators should be relevant, methodologically sound, measurable, easy to communicate and access, and limited in number. We also invite the United Nations Statistical Commission to follow- up on gaps in coverage and capacity building needs on the financing indicators.
	2. We commit to deepen substantive discussions at the ECOSOC FFD Forum through an in-depth review of the action areas of the financing for development outcomes in a biennial cycle. This will allow for deeper reporting by the Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, more focus in ECOSOC FFD Forum outcome document negotiations, and more in-depth and meaningful discussion at the ECOSOC FFD Forum by Member States and relevant stakeholders on emerging issues and specific challenges, including in the special high-level meeting with the Bretton Woods institutions, WTO and UNCTAD. To strengthen follow-up on action areas in the years that they are discussed in-depth, we will:
		1. on domestic public resources, use the ECOSOC Special Meetings on Financial Integrity and on Tax, which involve all relevant stakeholders, to discuss options for commitments and actions to be agreed in the ECOSOC FFD Forum outcome;
		2. on private business and finance, commit to enhanced engagement of the private sector, building on existing mechanisms such as the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development Business Steering Committee and the Global Investors for Sustainable Development Alliance;
		3. on international development cooperation, align the ECOSOC FFD Forum and the DCF cycles, with the DCF held prior to and reporting to the ECOSOC FFD Forum;
		4. on international trade, hold the special high-level meeting that engages with WTO and UNCTAD in a separate session in the ECOSOC FFD Forum;
		5. on debt, hold a dialogue between the Paris Club, other official creditors and debtors and the United Nations, along with the IMF and World Bank and other relevant actors;
		6. on systemic issues, discuss the outcomes of the ECOSOC High-level Special Meetings on Credit Ratings, and invite regulatory standard setters such as the Financial Stability Board to participate in the ECOSOC FFD Forum;
		7. on science, technology and innovation, invite authorities of different jurisdictions to share experience and expertise on policy and regulatory frameworks to respond to the effects of digital technologies on financing for development.
	3. We will continue to hold the High-level Dialogue on Financing for Development of the General Assembly every four years, back-to-back with the High-Level Political Forum under the auspices of the General Assembly when the high-level political forum is convened.
	4. To strengthen national follow-up, we will appoint focal points for financing for development in our finance and other relevant ministries and establish cross-departmental platforms for financing for development policy coordination and preparing national presentations, building on INFF experiences, where appropriate.
	5. To strengthen peer review and further enhance participation from capitals, we will invite countries to present Financing Action Reviews on progress and challenges in implementing the Financing for Development outcomes at the ECOSOC FFD Forum, building on INFFs where appropriate, in a similar format to voluntary national reviews on SDG implementation, in a ministerial segment of the ECOSOC FFD Forum to incentivize reporting by Member States, and to catalyze investment through the SDG Investment Fair.
	6. We commit to strengthen regional follow-up processes, led by regional economic commissions, with regular regional reporting on progress, regional committees, and consultations on progress and priorities.
	7. We will consider the need to hold a follow-up conference by 2029.
2. We commit to undertake collective efforts to enact concrete policies and actions within this renewed global financing framework, with the aim of achieving sustainable development and rebuilding trust in multilateralism.